Challenge for Atheists: Define God

Edit - nope that wasn't quite right

 

I don't think the answer "God merely knows what one will do" presupposes either circumstance.

1) The definition "Freedom is defined by doing what you want" to do is oversimplified. No one reasonably assumes that the type of freedom we are discussing would free us from the bounds of physical reality, rather we are discussing to what extent we are bound by previous causal chains. Certainly we are bound to an extent but to what extent? Are we completely devoid of choice? Mere automatons? Or can we make decisions about how we want live within the bounds of reality? We are mainly concerned here with choices about morality and the ability to choose among available options. To go to the extreme of saying "since I can't choose to be an aardvark then I am not free" is not very convincing.

2) there is no presupposition that since I have the ability to choose among available options that I would be able to change the past. It seems to me that what you are saying is that since God knows what is happening at any point on a timeline then everything on that timeline appears to be a past event. That is an example of how our minds are limited to consider reality from our three dimensional perspective where our consciousness is limited to a finite point on the timeline. A being that exists beyond the fourth dimension would experience all points on the timeline equally - past, present and future are all available. This is something you and I can only imagine. You tend to think that everything would appear to be a past even to such a being but it would be just as correct to say that everything would also be a future event or a present event. I think that's probably the point of the omnipotent part of the definition of this being - it can do anything at anytime if it chooses.

I have to lol at that last part though because if this being is making choices then it is also presumably responding to a set of forces that guide it to favour one decision over another or this being too would just be making random changes outside of a moral context. It demonstrates how we can't conceive of choice unless there are causal forces at play.

These are examples of a priori modes of thinking that shape our philosophy. Just like the ancient Greeks or romans our gods reflect our own natures because we can't conceive of anything else.

 

RE: Issue of the Affect of God Knowing the Future on Free Will!
※→ WillReadmore, et al,

Yes, it is hard to keep on track with this topic.

When we examine "Free Will," we have to consider that in the case of a Supreme Being (SB) and the impact the SB has on Mortal Man (MM), what it means in having more than one option in between choices with the realm of the future. This is a form of the two considerations:

• The Argument in Fatalism and Determinism.

Ω The SB is unlimited power; a being present everywhere at the same time; unbound by the constrains of MM perception of distance and time; a Being that has unlimited knowledge, absolute total awareness understanding ⇒ has perceived all things of the past, in the present, and into the future.
​

• The Illusion of Choice.

Ω That MM is capable of an act of selection or decision making from two or more possibilities without external interference.​

(CONDITIONAL IF → THEN)

The Arguments are that IF the SB has knowledge of the future, THEN that the future the is predetermined; fate preordained by the SB having knowledge of it. IF the SB knows today what decisions MM will make tomorrow THEN choice is an illusion → expressing factual implications of the foreknowledge.

IF the MM has true choice, unencumbered by foreknowledge by the SB, THEN the SB is NOT omniscient; absent unlimited knowledge of the future.

(EPILOG ⇔ SIDEBAR SUPPORT)

This argument set is further questioned: IF the SB is all powerful, THEN can the SB lie to its creations concerning "free will?" Is the SB restricted by the morals of MM? Do the SB have to be forthcoming to its MM creations?

An inkling of the truth as (if you believe) revealed by the SB:

Ephesian 1:11 (NIV)
•• In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will,

§ Additional Excerpts

Romans 8:29
Romans 8:30
Ephesians 1:5​

Is the SB ultimately responsible for the actions of its creations (good or bad) since it created a MM; that the SB knew in advance, would have behavioral issues? Has the SB no culpability?

Most Respectfully,
R

 

RE: Issue of the Affect of God Knowing the Future on Free Will!
※→ WillReadmore, et al,

This would be correct in the case of Mortal Man (MM). It is not the case relative to a Supreme Being (SB).

(COMMENT)

IF the SB knows today (that MM will select "X") what MM will select between "X" and "Y" tomorrow:

THEN:

IF MM selects "X" THEN MM followed the ultimate plan and the SB's foreknowledge was correct and true.
IF MM selects "Y" THEN MM did not follow the ultimate plan and the SB's knowledge was incorrect and untrue making the SB imperfect in foreknowledge (not omniscient).

SINCE: The SB cannot be imperfect in foreknowledge, THEN MM had no option but to pick "X". "Y" was an illusion as an option because it was not what the perfect SB had foreknowledge of.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

God: The intelligent being that created the universe. I don't believe that the universe was created by an intelligent being so I am an atheist.

 

Actually, there is nothing to define as this gawd does not exist.

 

Well, I don't find compatibilism to be persuasive, so we agree there. I'm only referring to how the dilemma has been historically addressed by theists (of course, compatibilism is also popular among many naturalists as well - particularly as it relates to the rise of neuroscience and the problem of consciousness - more about that later). However, defining free will in terms of "being able to do otherwise" seems to me fundamental. It does not follow that this position entails your last statement - being able to do otherwise, does not mean that one is not free unless one can do everything. Only that there must be some option available to do otherwise - I am free presumably if I can choose (i.e. cause myself) to go either east or west, but this doesn't entail that if I can't fly to the moon, that I am not free.

As for previous causal chains, of course these inform our choices, but what you are referring to is a question of causal agency - can agents cause themselves to act? Is there some conscious decision-making that resists the determined materialism of the natural world (if the world is entirely as physicists suggest, nothing but material cause and effect, then all desires, interests, acts (both physical and mental) are the acts of a determined world - hence you find compatibilism taking hold here as a way to account for free will in these circles (of course quantum indeterminancy problematizes this a bit). Philosophically, you can look at Kant's response to Hume to find the possibility of human causation transcendentally (if all knowledge is necessarily of phenomena, and phenomena itself is always a mental representation, then the world in itself is unknown and hence the possibility of indeterminancy exists in this unknown "noumenal" realm). Although, personally, I find the naturalism of say the classic American Pragmatic tradition more compelling here: through one's interactions with nature one becomes self-aware which can lead to reflection on future matters, and by virtue of this there arises cases in which choice involves in-depth reflection and personal effort. In other words, the individual's agency/actions are the determining cause. For a more contemporary account, I find Robert Kane's work illuminating here. Regardless, it appears that the ability to choose otherwise is necessary for freedom.

I am only talking about one type of solution that is offered by traditional theists in order to make sense of the idea that God knows in 1980 what you will do today. I don't find the suggestion that we can change the past (going back to Ockham's formulation) convincing. On the other hand, the idea that God exists outside of time, is conceptually a different type of answer to the problem of omniscience and free will and as I suggested above problematizes traditional theistic views. If God is outside of time any talk about acting, interacting, thinking, intervening, etc. are rendered conceptually incoherent, since all of those are acts and as such are temporal (within time - each has a beginning, middle, and end). For this reason, theists who go this route risk throwing the baby out with the bath water. That's not to say that it's wrong for this reason, it just means that theists who want to defend a traditional view of God, would find it disconcerting (quick disclosure, I'm not a theist).

But of course we can reflect on the limitations of those modes of thinking, and start to conceive anew or even dismiss them as being insufficient. The issue that this turns on is the question of causal agency, and it's possibility (which I am suggesting requires at least the idea that one can do otherwise.

 

Can one choose a different option than the one God already knows. It's a simple yes or no.

 

If the choices we make in real time, are already known ahead of time, can we change the choice in real time from the choice known ahead of time. Or will those choices always be made that are already known?

Could Hitler made any other choices that those he made? If some god knew all the choices prior to him even being born.

 

Exactly. MM has no real choice, just the mere illusion of free will if there is a SB with omniscience.

 

No, you can't change your choice.

The reason you can't change your choice is that we humans can not go back in time.

Once you do something, that's it. That is part of the permanent record that you absolutely have NO WAY of changing.

That has NOTHING to do with God. It has to do with what it means to be a human being.

 

God is the empty set:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empty_set

In mathematics, and more specifically set theory, the empty set is the unique set having no elements; its size or cardinality (count of elements in a set) is zero. Some axiomatic set theories ensure that the empty set exists by including an axiom of empty set; in other theories, its existence can be deduced. Many possible properties of sets are vacuously true for the empty set.

The mathematical symbols employed below are explained here.

For any set (god) A:

• The empty set is a subset of A:
  ∀ A : ∅ ⊆ A

 

OK, once again the thing here is that God exists in all time, not just the now.

So, His knowledge of Hitler's decisions came from watching Hitler make those decisions.

Once God saw a decision by Hitler, that information was available to God in all times - since He is timeless. God had the knowledge, but it came from Hitler actually making the decision - a decision that he had NO way of changing, because humans can't go back in time to change their decisions.


That's not the end of the "free will" issue, obviously. God COULD contrive to have us make certain decisions in some way. I know Christians who think the "Spirit moved them" to do something. There is the "obedience to God" thing that comes up - could Abraham refuse to sacrifice his son Issac? Surely God could run us like puppets if he chose to do so.

All I'm saying is that His knowledge of the future doesn't deny us our choices.

 

RE: Issue of the Affect of God Knowing the Future on Free Will!
※→ WillReadmore, et al,

Mortal Men cannot make a decision that is contrary to that foreknowledge known by the Supreme Being (SB), if a SB exists and is all knowing. However, if an SB does not exist, then there is no conflict.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

Sorry for the clumsiness in advance.

I think you are showing that MM can not change the choice that MM already made. I agree with that. MM would have to travel back in time in order to make a different choice.

But, MM wasn't constrained when MM made the choice.

That is, the SB knowledge of the choice made by MM came by SB watching MM make that choice - a choice MM can only make once, because of inability to travel back in time.

That choice doesn't constitute a "plan". It was the actual choice. Once MM made that choice, MM had no way of changing it, because MM can't time travel.

The only time travel here is that of SB conveying the information (what SB watched) to itself in other times. For a timeless SB, once something is known it is known by SB in all times. But, without adding some method of control that so far isn't part of this scenario, that information came from watching the actual event, which occurs only once in time.

Sorry for the word count!

There are ways to add to this scenario, I'm sure.

 

I think the point that others and myself are making here, is to ask whether or not you believe that someone can choose between various options. It seems that you want to answer yes, and that God knows what act one "chooses" because God is timeless. However, timeless can mean eternity in the sense of having no beginning and no end (but this would not solve the dilemma), or it can mean being outside of time, but here God couldn't watch - because watching is itself an act within in time - it is a temporal act (there is the experience of watching which has a beginning and an end).

Crossing my fingers that this doesn't move into a metaphysical discussion on the reality of time - the A-series/B-series stuff can be a bit...tedious.

 

RE: Issue of the Affect of God Knowing the Future on Free Will!
※→ WillReadmore, et al,

Yes, you follow the concepts expounded by Dr. Kenneth Dorter PhD, Pennsylvania State University (Brilliant). He argues your view point quite convincingly. I recommend the video: ... What Is Free Will Free From? ...

(COMMENT)

He does expand the question into the issues of moral guidance, responsibility, determinism, punishment relative to character and causal effects.

Your position is well founded and you are in good company. Of course it takes the ground held by those that believe in the existence of the Supreme Being.

Free Will is FREE From:

• Compulsion
• Causality
• Irrational/Irresponsible behaviors​

He takes the position that "compatibilism" is the better ground to hold --- the better argument to defend.

I hold the position that there is no Supreme Being that would intervene in the decisions of man. (But that is another topic.)

I get the impression that Dr Dorter (et al) disregards the chain of causality and the Theory of First Motion, (But that - again - is another topic.)

Most Respectfully,
R

 

OK - I'll try not to muck of conversations that go there!

I'm somewhat guided by not wanting to dispute what God can/can not do and would prefer to believe we can reliably explore our universe through observation.

Christians seem to believe God is eternal, knows every event that transpires throughout the entire time span of our universe and beyond, and is available for interaction with humans.

 

Another consideration regarding the problem of evil:
God is all-powerful and can accomplish any thing he wants;
God wants all men to be saved (have everlasting life);
All men will eventually be saved as a result of the predetermined path God has set forward for them;

I can answer this multiple ways but the answer I am interested in right now is yes, we can. This is what we do when we train or educate ourselves. Consider addiction. Addiction can alter our physiology to make us physically dependent upon a chemical. Freeing ourselves of that chemical addiction is not just a matter of making a single choice. As Jean-Paul Sartre says "we are damned to be free". We must make that choice over and over again until not being addicted becomes our new path based on previous causal events. Distancing ourselves mentally from our addiction helps. Instead of saying "I need a cigarette" changing the dialogue to "I am experiencing a craving" or 'I feel like I need a cigarette." As minor as the distinction is between statements is, it begins to make a difference in how we think about cigarettes. I began making these distinctions decades ago and now the "causal path" that I am on is characteristic of a non smoker and it's easier for me to be a non-smoker than it would be to be a smoker. Back in the day it was easier to be a smoker. I was on a causal path of a smoker before. Now I am not. I made that change through multiple decisions over a period of several days.

 

God is the thing you can't understand!

 

It's not about going back in time. It's about what is going to happen. And the omniscient being knows exactly what will happen and can't be changed according to me and now, you.

So how is there free will with an omniscient being knowing exactly what choices and actions will take place?

 

Because God has so many traits, depending on what one believes, there are near limitless things god could do.
And each individual belief will contradict with the next one's.

 

By definition, all omniscience means is that He knows - He can see the future.

That doesn't mean you can't choose what to do - it just means He can watch "future-you" making the choices you want to make.

If you want to find a threat to free will, you have to find a method of controlling that choice - not just seeing it in the future.

God as defined by Christianity is certainly powerful enough to deny you free will if he wanted to do so, but it would take something else - not just seeing the future.

 

The other possibility is that there are multiple timelines, each a bit different based on decisions you make and God is aware of everything in all those timelines.

 

Remember, the biblical God is the deity of the Hebrews. He likes the smell of roasting sheep and he hates yeast bread. And if you don't redeem the firstborn of your donkey with a lamb you have to break the donkey colt's neck but you can't do it on the sabbath or else you will be stoned to death for working on the sabbath.