Like most people, for me the most important thing about legislation is the wording of laws, edicts, resolutions, pacts, etc., and not what people say about them before or afterwards. To place more emphasis on what an individual says than on the WORDS which were approved, is to invite choas .... exactly as we have seen in this thread.

Let me try again to illustrate why I insist on reverting to the actual words.

1) Here is your quote by one of the authors on UNSC resolution 242:
"Prof. Eugene Rostow, former Undersecretary of State, a key author of 242, international law authority, Yale University: "UN SC 242 calls on Israel to withdraw only from territories occupied in the course of the Six Day War - that is, not from 'all' the territories or even from 'the' territories... "

Why was he worried about an interpretation that might imply "all" of the territories, when he himself clearly says it only means that Israel should withdraw from territories occupied in the course of the Six Day War? What territories was he trying to ensure that Israel need NOT withdraw from?

In 1991 he became more specific, stating "Israel is required to withdraw its armed forces "from territories" it occupied during the Six-Day War--not from "the" territories nor from "all" the territories, but from some of the territories, which included the Sinai Desert, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip." I repeat, what then were the territories NOT mandatory regarding (permanent) withdrawal.

2) Lord Caradon: You offered that Lord Caradon refused to include "ALL the territories". In that case why did he allow that noteworthy preamble which states - "Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". Surely he was not so senile as to be able to recognise that if Israel was only required to withdraw from SOME territories, those that it did NOT withdraw from, would have been acquired by war, and hence be in complete conflict with the underpinning of the resolution as stated in the preamble. What was his idea as chief author of 242 of putting this Emphasis in as background to the intructions that followed? It seems to make zero sense if it is as you interpret 242.

Let's look further at what the venerable Lord, chief author of UNSC 242 had to say to see if we can clear up this apparent conflict of meaning.
"Knowing as I did the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line (a poor choice of term in my opinion), I wasn’t prepared to use wording in the Resolution that would have made that line permanent. Nonetheless, it is necessary to say again that the overwhelming principle was the ‘inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war’ and that meant that there could be no justification for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely because it had been conquered in the 1967 war." [Lord Caradon, United Nations Security Council Resolution Two Forty Two - A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Georgetown University, 1981)]

So, what we in fact see here are 2 authors of 242, both admitting that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissable, and the chief author calling this "an overwhelming principal". No matter what follows, from this it is absolutely clear that Israels occupation and, to make matters worse, its continued territorial land grab, is in plain and utter contravention of UNSC 242. No reasonable person with even the slightest command of English can misread the original text and the Caradon explanation.

So why the emphasis on excluding "the". Caradon makes it clear that it is NOT SO AS TO ALLOW ISRAEL TO ACQUIRE TERRITORY BY ILLEGAL MEANS. Instead, he did not want the "1967 line" to be seen as permanent. As he later explains it, it might well have been that in future negotiations, some of this territory occupied by Israel might in fact become part of the Zionist State, in exchange for Israeli ground that would make more sense as part of a Palestinian state. The resolution should not preclude this acquisition by Israel.

So Caradon is both clear that acquisition via war was not to be tolerated, as well as clear that final borders might be such that Israel's permanent acquisition of territory beyond the 1949 Armistice line should be possible, and hence its withdrawal should not be seen as a permanent prohibition.

And obviously the problem was one of time. These weasel concepts were undertaken so as to get 242 through the security council. Commentaries by the vast majority of the voting members makes it clear that Israel was not meant to gain from instigating war.

And here is where the mess started - UNSC 242 was meant to be implemented in a short period of time. Israel withdraws at almost the same time as permanent borders are determined by negotiation. But we all know that that is not what happened.

The interpretation that "Until there is a peace deal, Israel could stay where it was" is a US view. Excuse me if I chose not to share it, and object to having it foist upon me. UNSC 242 says nothing of the sort - nothing. As we have seen recently, the "American" view on the ME is viewed as suspect by most of the remaining civilised world.

Israels view is that it needs to withdraw only when there is peace and lasting secure borders. i.e. surprise, surprise, = the US position. The Palestinian people in general waiting until 1987 before the first intifada occurred - 20 years later. That's a long time to wait.