Ok, had a closer look at your Globalsecurity link...
In my estimation of that article, they are farther away than you think.
One aspect is the Plutonium isotope issue addressed here:
Quote:
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Normally for electrical power production the uranium fuel remains in the reactor for three to four years, which produces a plutonium of 60 percent or less Pu-239, 25 percent or more Pu-240, 10 percent or more Pu-241, and a few percent Pu-242. The Pu-240 has a high spontaneous rate of fission, and the amount of Pu-240 in weapons-grade plutonium generally does not exceed 6 percent, with the remaining 93 percent Pu-239. Higher concentrations of Pu-240 can result in pre-detonation of the weapon, significantly reducing yield and reliability. For the production of weapons-grade plutonium with lower Pu-240 concentrations, the fuel rods in a reactor have to be changed frequently, about every four months or less.
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There is a lot of critical information missing in this article that would help to really explain what a timeline may look like. First, it doesn't say how much plutonium is created per fuel rod, only the percentage of usable 239 in a given timeframe. This ties directly into the next aspect of the equation, which is that they receive their fuel rods from Russia, and are supposed to return the spent rods. Obviously that could change, but since they don't have in-country access to uranium rods at the moment, their potential weapons inventory is limited to Russian rod output. As of the writing of the article, it says they have 180 rods, and no way to do the chemical separation. --A major, major hurdle as we have previously discussed. This also begs the critical question of how many rods a reactor head needs to function. A rod at Hanford has a life span of 2 years. The rods are rotated out on some sort of schedule so the head always has a average power output (i.e., the head has old, medium, and new rods in it any time). Since we don't know the capacity of the reactor in Iran or the amount of plutonium created per rod, we have no idea what the actual plutonium output is. Moreover, the plutonium output is directly related to the efficiency of the head-- if you don't have new rods to drive the reaction, the existing Pu is poisoned by its own isotopes by waiting too long.
I hope this makes sense. If I need to explain some part of it more clearly, let me know...
The second, and really unaddressed aspect of the article is the lack of separation facility. I know this sounds simple, but it really is a huge hurdle that must be crossed. First, Iran must have access to its own supply of fuel rods, and second, it must have the technology and impetus to do so. These are daunting.