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Joker · #**106** (**permalink**) 07-20-2008, 03:58 PM

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Originally Posted by L337SIMBA

Yes...it was necessary! I'm not sure where you got this idea of "japan surrending" from. The Japanese Emperor refused to sign the Potsdam treaty. Of course the US did not like that because they wanted to end the war.

Okay, you got to get off this textbook version you're learning in high school. Japan had not formally surrendered, but they were ready to, and were in talks with the Soviets to help them mediate surrender conditions on their behalf. US spies knew all about it because we had broken the codes that they were using to communicate with the Soviets. In other words, it was no secret to Truman in the weeks prior to dropping the bomb that the Japanese wanted to end the war.

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Japan seeks peace through the Soviets

In the meantime, the Japanese government was attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to mediate a peace for Japan that would not be unconditional. This was in response to the Emperor's request at a Big Six meeting on June 22, 1945 to seek peace thru the Soviets, who were the only major member of the Allies that had a neutrality pact with Japan at the time (Butow, pg. 118-120). Unfortunately for all concerned, Japan's leaders were divided over precisely what terms should be sought to end the war, with the Japanese military leaders still wishing to avoid anything that the Allies would have considered a clear "surrender". Surely Japan's leaders hold the lion's share of the responsibility for the fate that befell Japan.
Having broken the code Japan used for transmitting messages, the U.S. was able to follow Japan's efforts to end the war as it intercepted the messages between Foreign Minister Togo and Japan's Ambassador to Moscow Sato. The messages were sent as the result of the June 22, 1945 Japanese Cabinet meeting. The conditions under which Japan was willing to surrender were not clearly spelled out in the messages, aside from a willingness to give up territory occupied during the war and a repeated rejection of "unconditional surrender".

July 1945 - Japan's peace messages

Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:

July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).

President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53). In passing up this possible opportunity for an earlier and less deadly peace, Truman was not deliberately trying to prolong the war so the atomic bomb could be used on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Briefly stated, it is likely that Truman believed the use of atomic bombs on Japan was necessary primarily for the reasons he always gave: "We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans" (Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945, pg. 212). (For the most thorough exposition of the view that the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union, see Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb. Due to its many sources of documentation, this book will be of interest whether one shares Alperovitz' views or not).

Hiroshima-- Was it Necessary?

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Too bad the Japanese were too arrogant and thought that they could win. Maybe someone should have given the Emperor better advice.

The one thing that was keeping the Japanese from signing the Potsdam Proclamation was the condition that the Emperor would have to resign from his position. It wasn't about arrogance, it was about culture. At the time, the Japanese thought of their Emperor as a god. Many of the government leaders were afraid that if the Emperor were removed from power, they would lose all reason to live. Of course, in hindsight, we can see that this turned out to be an unwarranted fear, but at the time, no one could tell for sure how the Japanese would react to the resignation of the Emperor. The logic was that losing the Emperor could cause the entire downfall of the nation (bear in mind that the hereditary line of Japanese Emperor's had never been broken for about 2,000 years). Many thought it would be better to die fighting. So the Potsdam went unsigned.

The thing is that the US knew all about the significance of their Emperor before dropping the bomb but ignored it. The US could have come forward and retracted the condition that the Emperor resign, but instead they just dropped the bomb, hoping to force the Japanese to sign on. Of course they did at that point.

But here's the thing the US did afterwards that just baffles the mind. After ignoring the Japanese's concern about their Emperor and dropping the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, forcing the Japanese to agree to their Emperor's resignation, the US changes the conditions and allows the Emperor to retain his position.

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Originally Posted by f100supersabr

I do not recal any "surrender with conditions" but even if there was talk of such a thing the Japanee would have dragged the "negotiations" out for such a long time thus giving the Evils Ones ( Soviet Russian Terrorists ) the opportunity to invade Japanese territory.

Why would the Japanese want to drag it out?

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I think that Truman knew well the Soviet threat and he made the righ decision.

Their was no reason to believe that the Soviets would invade Japanese territory. The Soviets actually had a pact of neutrality with the Japanese at the time.

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Futhermore dduring the period of "negotiations" more Americans would have died not to mention our good allies such as the Brits, Ausies, New Zealanders, ( I of course exclude the Evil Ones from the good ally list.

From who? The Japanese weren't even fighting at this point.