China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues
Summary
Congress has long been concerned about whetherU.S. policy advances theU.S.
interest in reducing the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver
them. Recipients of China’s technology include Pakistan and countries that the State
Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. This CRS
Report discusses the national security problem of China’s role in weapons
proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation,
since the mid-1990s. A table summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC
entities for weapons proliferation. This CRS Report will be updated as warranted.
Since 1991, China has taken some steps to mollify concerns about its role in
weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies fromChina have aggravated trends that
result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer range
missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) has reported, China remains a “key supplier” of weapons
technology — particularly missile or chemical technology.
Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions,
and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to
waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites
to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return
for another promise from China on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC
proliferation activities again raised questions about sanctions. On 8 occasions, the
Bush Administration has imposed sanctions on PRC entities (not the government)
for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to
Pakistan and Iran, under the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act,
IranNonproliferationAct, Iran-IraqArms NonproliferationAct, and ExecutiveOrder
12938. Among the actions, on September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed
missile proliferation sanctions denying satellite exports (for 2 years), after a PRC
company transferred technology to Pakistan, despite the November 2000 promise.
During preparations for the U.S.-PRC summit in October 2002 at Crawford, TX,
China, on August 25, 2002, published the missile export controls promised in
November 2000. With questions about China’s enforcement of the regulations and
reductions in proliferation activities, President Bush has not waived the sanctions
imposed in September 2001. Moreover, on May 23, June 26, and July 30, 2003, the
Administration imposed sanctions onPRCentities formissile proliferation, signaling
U.S. frustrations with China. China’s cooperation is also sought on North Korea.
The 107th Congress enacted the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L.
107-306) with Section 827 (inserted by Senator Thompson) to require the DCI to
submit annual reports on PRC and other foreign companies that are involved in
weapons proliferation and raise funds in U.S. capitalmarkets. In the 108th Congress,
the Senate’s FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (S. 1025, passed as H.R. 2417
on July 31, 2003) included Section 339(f) to repeal the above reporting requirement.