GREAT INFORMATION!

#1 (**permalink**) 07-06-2004, 02:58 PM

Quote:

The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force Act of 2001

(House Resolution 93

Status of H.R. 938 Cosponsors

The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (H.R. 93

was introduced on March 8, 2001 by Representatives James McGovern (D-MA) and Amo Houghton (R-NY) in the House of Representatives. The legislation calls upon the President to use the United States' "voice, vote, and influence" to urge the UN:
to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (Police and Security Force) that can be quickly dispatched under the authority of the UN Security Council; to recruit volunteer personnel for the force; and to provide equitable and reliable funding for the Police and Security Force.

Additionally, the legislation calls upon the President to:
urge UN member nations to enter into regional partnerships for the purpose of forming Rapid Deployment Brigades, made up of on-call units of national forces, capable of deploying within 30 days of a Security Council resolution;
and direct the Secretary of Defense to undertake a study to determine the availability of and feasibility of using U.S. forces as part of the rapid deployment brigades.

What would the Police and Security Force do? It would:
be able to deploy within 15 days of a Security Council resolution to establish international peace operations, with a limited deployment of no more than six months for any given mission;
only be deployed when the Security Council determines that violations of human rights and/or breaches of the peace require a rapid response to ensure adherence to negotiated agreements to prevent or end hostilities;
consist of at least 6,000 volunteers employed directly by the UN, who train together and are appropriately equipped expressly for international peace operations, including civilian policing; and
be given the authority to protect itself, execute negotiated peace accords, disarm combatants, protect civilians, detain war criminals, restore the rule of law, and to carry out other purposes as detailed in Security Council resolutions.

What will the Police and Security Force not do?
The Police and Security Force is not a permanent army. Its primary purpose is to fill the three to six month average gap between when the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation and when the international community is ready to deploy national forces. It can only be deployed with a Security Council resolution, over which the U.S. has veto power.
The Police and Security Force will not serve in any specific area for more than 6 months. It will be a temporary force until a more permanent peacekeeping mission, can be established.
This force will not be used in large-scale interventions (i.e. Kuwait). It will not fight its way into ongoing conflicts.

Why do we need a Police and Security Force?
The Police and Security Force fills the time gap and increases the chance of mission success. Currently, it takes an average of three to six months to deploy peacekeeping troops following a Security Council decision. During this time, a country's political situation can worsen dramatically, leading to conflict escalation and reducing the chance of a peaceful resolution. The Police and Security Force would create the ability to contain conflict and stabilize the political situation, while giving regular peacekeeping units from member nations sufficient time to deploy. It would also reduce civilian casualties and human rights violations that currently occur in the time gap between decision and deployment.
The Police and Security Force fills the training gap. In peacekeeping operations, troops from multiple nations with different levels of training, numerous native languages, and incompatible communication and weapons systems must work together in very confusing circumstances. The new force would smooth the transition for the replacement force of Member State peacekeeping troops by establishing an initial UN presence and providing background information about the situation to Member State forces when they arrived.
The Police and Security Force reduces the political will gap. A common problem with peacekeeping is the lack of political will among Member States to contribute national troops to missions. However, members of the UN rapid deployment force would be trained, individual volunteers for an international force rather than unwilling recruits from any one country. The new force would contain the conflict while providing Member State leaders the time they need to gain support for contributing troops to the long-term mission from their colleagues and constituents. Finally, the rapid deployment unit would not be hampered by the command and control problems typical of traditional UN peacekeeping forces, as it would be employed directly by the U.N.

Why do we need Rapid Deployment Brigades?
Last year's Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the "Brahimi Report," recommended that UN members enter into partnerships to form several coherent rapid deployment brigades to enable speedier and more effective deployment of peacekeeping forces. Unlike the quickly deployable Police and Security Force, these brigades would not be capable or reaching a crisis spot within 15 days.
The Police and Security Force is purposefully limited in nature and small in size, and thus cannot serve as a replacement for a larger and more robust UN peacekeeping force, if needed
The UN needs a spectrum of peacekeeping capabilities, ranging from the light, but quickly deployable Police and Security Force to larger, heavier peacekeeping forces.
Speaking before the United Nations Security Council on November 15, 2000, former United States Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke stated "unless we move decisively on meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capability to perform its essential peacekeeping function".(*)

Catch22 · #2 (**permalink**) 07-07-2004, 02:32 PM

I thought I would paste the text of the actual bill so you can see for yourself what it says. I am not making any comment either way. I just thought it was more obejective to see this than a comment from an unknown source. This is from the US House Website. The current status of the bill is that it has been referred to the House Committee on International Relations.

Quote:

HR 938 IH

107th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 938
To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 8, 2001
Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. FRANK, and Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A BILL
To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) The December 1999 United Nations `Report on the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda' indicates that in April 1994, the United Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two weeks of the initial violence, thereby allowing the conflict to escalate. The six-month estimated cost of the deployment would have been $115,000,000. Instead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives along with $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.

(2) The April 2000 report of the United Nations Secretary General, `We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century', states that only member nations of the United Nations can fix the structural weakness of United Nations peace operations. The report compares the current system for launching peacekeeping operations to a volunteer fire department that has to find fire engines and the funds to run them before starting to douse any flames. The present United Nations system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military personnel. Availability and readiness of forces is very unpredictable and constraints on resources preclude rapid deployment.

(3) In August 2000, the specially-appointed panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued its findings. Known as the `Brahimi Report' (A/55/305; S/2000/809), the report concludes that `few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future'. These building blocks include a standing police corps, a reserve corps of mission leadership, a sufficient stockpile of equipment, and arrangements for recruitment of civilian personnel. Furthermore, the report encourages member nations to enter partnerships with one another in the context of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS). These partnerships would form the basis for Rapid Deployment Brigades (RDBs), which would develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy `traditional' peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution and to fully deploy `complex' peacekeeping operations within 90 days of the adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution.

(4) Former United States Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, speaking before the United Nations Security Council on November 15, 2000, stated that `[u]nless we move decisively on meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capability to perform its essential peacekeeping function'.

(5) Both the nations of Europe and the United States have recognized the value and need for rapidly deployable combat units in response to a full spectrum of contingencies, including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts, and full-scale warfare. The European Union has proposed forming a standing police force and rapid deployment brigades as part of the European Defense Force, and in the United States, the Department of Defense is establishing interim brigade combat teams as part of the overall Army transformation strategy.

(6) The United States' veto power in the United Nations Security Council gives it the capacity to halt the deployment of United Nations forces if the deployment is not in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT- The President shall direct the United States representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the United Nations--

(1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) that--

(A) is rapidly deployable under the authority of the United Nations Security Council;

(B) should be able to deploy within 15 days of a United Nations Security Council resolution to establish international peace operations;

(C) is limited to a maximum deployment of six months for any given mission;

(D) should be deployed only when the United Nations Security Council determines that violations of human rights, breaches of the peace, or the failure to restore the rule of law, requires rapid response to ensure adherence to
negotiated agreements to prevent or end hostilities;

(E) should be composed of at least 6,000 volunteers who train together and are appropriately equipped expressly for international peace operations, including civilian policing; and

(F) should be given the authority to protect itself, execute negotiated peace accords, disarm combatants, protect civilians, detain war criminals, restore the rule of law, and to carry out other purposes as detailed in United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(2) to recruit personnel to serve in the Force; and

(3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for the Force.

(b) DEFINITION- In this section, the term `international peace operations' means any operation carried out under a United Nations Security Council resolution.

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADES.

In order to promote the development of human and material resources for United Nations peacekeeping operations as recommended by the August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305; S/2000/809), commonly known as the `Brahimi Report', the President--

(1) shall direct the Secretary of State and the United States representative to the United Nations to encourage the member nations of the United Nations to enter into partnerships with one another, in the context of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form the basis for Rapid Deployment Brigades, which would develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy `traditional' peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution and `complex' peacekeeping operations within 90 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution; and

(2) shall direct the Secretary of Defense to undertake a study, not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, to determine the advisability of and the feasibility of using interim combat brigade teams as part of Rapid Deployment Brigades as described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT.

Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on--

(1) the status of negotiations to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) in accordance with section 3;

(2) the status of United States activities to encourage member nations of the United Nations to establish Rapid Deployment Brigades in accordance with section 4(1); and

(3) the results of the study conducted under section 4(2).

#3 (**permalink**) 07-07-2004, 05:05 PM

Where did you get this? Are you paranoid? This is just the kind of un-American stuff that all these wacko's have been putting out all over the place. Get a grip. Conspiracys are so un-American.

Catch22 · #4 (**permalink**) 07-07-2004, 11:23 PM

Alright you need to calm down Constution, First of all I already stated that this is from the US House of Representatives Website. It is the text to the bill mentioned in your article above. If you want to read it there you go, it is the completely unbiased source. You can read it for yourself and make up your own conclusion about it. I do not know where you got your article, but I was just helping you out.

#5 (**permalink**) 07-08-2004, 02:09 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Catch22";p=&quot

Alright you need to calm down Constution, First of all I already stated that this is from the US House of Representatives Website. It is the text to the bill mentioned in your article above. If you want to read it there you go, it is the completely unbiased source. You can read it for yourself and make up your own conclusion about it. I do not know where you got your article, but I was just helping you out.

Thanks I will try to live up to your standards from now on. Thanks for straightening me out. Guess I better take another sip of cool aid and hide in my basement with my guns.

#6 (**permalink**) 10-19-2004, 04:39 PM

10/15/04

The 9/11 Concept

For eight years the Talaban/ Al Qaeda knew that President Clinton was very weak. The World Trade Center, Embassy, and USS Cole were all bombed, just to name a few, without any reprisals from the US except for a handful of cruise missiles on a pill factory. Clinton's priorities were on other pressing matters, in the white house....

9/11 started with Clinton. In the 2000 election after Bush won the Presidency the Dem's relentlessly were accusing Bush of stealing the Presidency. Bush was illegitimate, the Dem's were pouncing on Bush 24/7, even today. Bush did have the appearance as a weak President, until 9/11, because the Dem 's were relentlessly attacking Bush to bring down his Presidency.

Democrats created a perfect environment for the Al Qaeda to attack America. Their only concern is power, the Democratic party is a power hungry organization, they don't care about us, not even our country, only power.

I truly believe the Talaban thought that Bush would do less then Clinton, thanks to the Dem's. They never in their wildest dreams thought that Bush would order a US military strike on their homeland base. On 9/11 over 3,000 lives were lost. Most Dem's on Capitol hill are not without blood on their hands.

Also the Iraqi war could have been averted possibly, without the 9/11 attack on America.

Concerned: citizen

Information for the American people

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