https://www.reddit.com/r/AskThe_Don...rt_1_im_doing_a_full_analysis_and_summary_of/ Here's part one of my summary and analysis. It's a complicated but I believe very important subject that I can't summarize in a single post. Tl;dr -- this is bigger than just Trump. It appears to be the same things that Edward Snowden was discussing. If the USA allows these people to have spied on Trump, they are actually allowing for the continuation of routine violations of the NSA's (and other related agencies') surveillance procedures that are meant to protect the privacy of all US citizens, stretching back to at least 2011. I don't believe that it would be an exaggeration to claim that this is a defining and existential issue for the United States. It appears to be a genuine clash between the pro-surveillance state and anti-surveillance state factions within the US government. Liberals might want to note that this is not just about Trump and Obama. If these powers stay in place, a future conservative government (such as Trump's, or someone theoretically "worse" than Trump) could use this situation against liberals. --- Pages 1-3: The court will review the application of procedures that protect US citizens from government surveillance. Page 4: The court acknowledges admissions of repeated non-compliance as to "minimization procedures" meant to protect the privacy of US citizens (information acquired through the use of "US person identifiers" as will be further explained). This presumably refers to the "unmasking" we keep hearing about. The court frames this as a reoccurring problem. Page 4: The government requested an extension to explain the "unmasking" issues and was granted said extension. Page 5: The court rejects initial explanations re: non-compliance. The court grants the government another extension. Note that by this point in time, according to the dates mentioned in the court's opinion that the government has stalled the FISA court for long enough to surpass the date of Trump's inauguration. It appears to be the case that the government is allowed to conduct surveillance during said time period even though the court is still waiting on their arguments. Page 6: At the request of the DOJ and the NSA, the court changes the rules, partially resolving the non-compliance issues. Pages 6-7: The 2016 certifications were targeted at non-US citizens. This appears to be referring to re-authorization of the FISA program generally, since it refers to certifications going as far back as 2008. Page 7: Further discussion of past certifications for surveilling non-US citizens. This is relevant because these certifications establish the rules regarding the "minimization" procedures that protect the privacy of US citizens. Page 8: "It's the court's role to examine the application of the minimization procedures..." [sic] Page 9: "... to ensure compliance with the procedures." [sic] Page 10: "[Argument pertaining to the fulfillment of] all elements of the procedures have now been provided to the court." [sic] Page 11: "The court also reviews the application of the minimization procedures for compliance with [various federal USC statutes]." [sic] Page 11: "Targeting procedures must be reasonably designed so as to reasonably insure the targeting of individuals outside of the United States." [sic] Page 11: "Applications may not intentionally target a United States citizen believed to be located outside of the United States." [sic] Page 11: "To be consistent with the Fourth Amendment... the court considers steps taken to avoid targeting United States citizens." [sic] Pages 11-12: The NSA is the lead agency for making targeting decisions. It makes these decisions based upon "selectors" such as phone numbers or email addresses. Page 12: The purpose of minimization procedures is to protect the information (privacy) of United States citizens. Page 13: An exception to the minimization procedures is when information on United States citizens is required, to aid in understanding or assessing the importance of the acquired intelligence. Page 14: In 2016 the government proposed having un-minimized access to information related to international terrorism. In other words, if information relates to terrorism, they proposed having no protections for US citizens. Page 14: "The court will discuss these suggestions now." [sic] Pages 14-15: The NSA frequently violated its own rules re: minimization procedures as to US persons in order to query information from internet "upstream" collection. The term "internet "upstream" collection" is explained in the paragraphs that follow. Page 15: Internet "upstream" collection refers to information that is not taken directly from an internet service provider. This refers to intercepting cell phone communications, emails and so-on in a direct fashion. Pages 15-16: The collection of "multiple communication transactions" such as emails between multiple sources makes separating US persons from non-US persons difficult (because individuals who fall into a variety of categories are interacting with each other) and this complicates the application of the minimization procedures. Page 16: Internet "upstream" collection of MCTs can result in the collection of a large amount of data on a non-target. I'm thinking of things like forwarded emails and so-on; irrelevant conversations that provide many details about a non-targets could be captured like this, intentionally or otherwise. Pages 16-17: MCT collection is the most common way that information on non-targets is gathered. Page 17: "This is not to say that all MCTs are equally problematic." Page 17: The court found in 2011 that the NSA has engaged in deficient application of minimization procedures. Page 17: The NSA suggested changes to the procedures, such as a sequestration period for certain types of MCTs. I assume the types referred to here are those MCTs that contain a certain threshold amount of information pertaining to US citizens and/or non-targets. An exception for "active users" is also discussed later on. Pages 17-18: An MCT cannot be kept for longer than 2 years after the expiration of the certificate pursuant to how it was acquired, unless applicable retention criteria is met. Page 18: "Of greatest relevance to the present discussion, those procedures categorically prohibited NSA analysts from using known U.S.-person identifiers to query the results of Internet upstream collection." The court approved the newly proposed procedures. Page 18: MCTs to an "active user" are less problematic than other types. Identifying MCTs to and from an "active user" are consistent with FISA and the Fourth Amendment. It's not explained how an "active user" is defined. My guess (or hope) is that it refers to active militants. Pages 18-19: As discussed above, the 2016 certification re: active users only applies to the acquisition of MCTs when the target is the active user. This is pertinent to what is discussed below." It appears then that the active user exemption was abused in the case at issue here. Page 19: "The NSA was violating the minimization procedures with much greater frequency than had been previously disclosed to the court." [sic] Page 19: "The problem was widespread during all periods of review." Pages 19-20: The NSA possesses an institutional "lack of candor" in addressing the problem which the court frames as a "serious Fourth Amendment issue."
DISMANTLE THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS NOW! -poe jic good tactic to cherry pick sentences out of context and one sentence interpretive "summary's" of pages interpretation. I appreciate the effort. Where might one get their hands on the full transcript?
Part 2 of my Analysis of the Leaked 100-Page Court Opinion that #ReleaseTheMemo is Based On Court Opinion: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C4M4tUGQxE3MGJ52aghDigJuqhT3b65S/view Page 20: "In light of recent revelations, the court found that it lacked sufficient information to assess compliance with the 2016 minimization procedures." [sic] Page 20: The government asked for and was granted another extension. Page 20: The government updated the court, blaming "human error" as the primary factor in the deficiencies but that design flaws were also a factor. Human error, that's one way to put it... Page 21: One design flaw is that analysts must query multiple sources at a time with an "opt-out" method for said sources instead of using an "opt-in" method which in the court's opinion would reduce non-compliance. **Page 21: The court notes that the NSA had not at this time fully assessed the scope of the problem: the IG and OCO reviews did not assess systems that analyze upstream data but don't interface with the NSA's query audit system. So, the NSA has surveillance systems that don't interface with their query audit system at all. That probably means there isn't even a potential for review.** Page 21: The NSA provides the court with further details on the steps they're taking to improve compliance. Pages 21-22: The NSA claims that fewer violations took place in 2016 than in previous audit periods. Page 22: The NSA states that it cannot answer the court's questions before January 31st, 2017. The court grants another extension. Quite a few extensions have been given at this point, bolstering the court's characterization of the NSA as possessing a "lack of candor". Pages 22-23: The NSA states that its compliance report has been completed and that it has redoubled training on query audits for compliance purposes, as well as developed new technology to help improve the compliance rate. Page 23: At this point the earlier plan, to sequester and later delete unrelated MCT data, was coming into effect. "Abouts" data would also no longer be collected. The term "abouts data" has not yet been defined. Page 23: "These changes should substantially reduce the acquisition of non-pertinent information concerning U.S. persons pursuant to Section 702." Section 702 being a statute related to compliance with the privacy laws. Page 23: As of March 17, 2017, the NSA had [redacted block]." I just thought this was funny. Page 24: Details are provided on the sequestration process that is meant to keep the NSA from accessing certain kinds of data. Page 25: "Abouts" information may no longer be acquired. They still haven't explained what "abouts" information is at this point by my understanding. Page 25: "The NSA Targeting Procedures are amended to state that "[a]cquisitions conducted under these procedures will be limited to communications to or from persons targeted in accordance with these procedures," **Page 25: "Unauthorized communications acquired will be destroyed. The NSA will report any unauthorized acquisitions to the court." [sic] This part could be interesting if they didn't report the Trump-related violations to the court after it was established that they should report all violations. I'm only on page 25 so far though so we'll see if that's alleged.** Page 26: References to "abouts" collection are to be removed from NSA instructional materials. **Page 26: If the NSA somehow acquires a forbidden form of an MCT, it is required to destroy it upon recognition.** **Page 26: The NSA may continue to collect MCTs under the existing procedures but only when the target is a party to the entire MCT, or in other words, when the target is the "active user".** **This part seems important: we now know what an "active user" is (I at least wasn't clear on that until this point) and it clarifies that the target must be involved in the entire MCT; MCTs where the target is not involved cannot be collected then. This is also starting to make sense in the context of which laws they were alleged to be broken in the surveillance of Trump/his associates.** Page 27: "It will still be possible for the NSA to acquire a domestic MCT under the proper conditions, for example [redacted]." [sic] **Page 27: "If NSA determines that the sender and all intended recipients of a discrete communication within an MCT were located in the United States at the time of that discrete communication, then the entire MCT must be promptly destroyed... unless the director makes the required waiver determination for each and every domestic communication contained within the MCT." I'm again wondering if this pertains to Trump.** Pages 27-28: In light of the elimination of the collection of "abouts" data, the government proposes a procedural change wherein "upstream" data using the identifiers of known U.S. persons may be analyzed. Page 28: The court grants this procedural change in light of the other limitations newly placed upon the NSA. Page 29: The court is satisfied that these new procedures will lead to improvements; less irrelevant domestic data gathered without hindering the acquisition of foreign data.
Sorry that I put the wrong link into the OP. I meant to put in a link to the document and instead I linked a thread on another forum. If you think I'm cherry picking sentences, feel free to read the whole thing yourself. Then post telling me where you believe I got it wrong. If you decline to do that then please don't make such accusations. Link to the court opinion: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C4M4tUGQxE3MGJ52aghDigJuqhT3b65S/view Edit: Apparently I'm an idiot and this may not be entirely what Nunes' memo is based on. It's still interesting for context though if so.
Perhaps we should wait a day or two for the dust to settle. the nunes memo will be exposed for what it is shortly. However, I will follow up because you have sparked my interest. thanks.
AFter scanning the document, I think most american's will be reassured that oversight of the intell gathering apparatus works and the agencies are working hard to comply with the court's directives. It stands to reason that given the complexity of the apparatus that non compliance issues will arise, including chronic issues. Seems to me that this document covers various changes to compliance processes and indicates what the agencies in questions have already done in that regard. I noted that raw data destruction or sequester is a central issue. Apparently NSA has been destroying that data as per court ordered procedural policy amendments. All in all, its a fascinating look under the hood. While abuses (deliberately or mistakenly) will always happen, but the reporting system is designed to identify them and their causes. IN fact there are a number of compliance and change orders specifically addressing causation. A continually improving and refining system designed to protect constitutional rights. It ain't perfect by any means, but wide scale abuse cannot be covered up, which is the whole point in the first place. TThere sure as hell is nothing there that indicates the "scandalous and dangerous" abuses Nune's little fiction is trying to imply. The truth will emerge and that incompetent conspiracy peddler will fail in the same embarrassing way he did those many months ago. Thanks for the link.
Nunes will get right on that, just as soon as he gets back to the Hill from wiping Trump's butt at the White House.....
