"There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations."

"In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative gained over an off-balanced enemy, the United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."

"U.S. war planners, practitioners and the civilian leadership conceived of the war far too narrowly, this overly simplistic conception of the war led to a cascading undercutting of the war effort: too few troops, too little coordination with civilian and governmental/non-governmental agencies and too little allotted time to achieve success."

He deemed the military performance in Iraq mediocre and said the army could lose the war.

The report was authored by Maj. Isaiah Wilson, the official historian of the U.S. Army for the Iraq war.

Wilson also served as a war planner for the army's 101st Airborne Division until March 2004.

http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtri...980555556.html