What if the World’s Most Expensive Fighter Planes Can’t Defeat Our Enemies?

Finally, people are starting to recognize that stealth isn't a magic wand, technology isn't the trump card it used to be, quantity can frequently win over quality, and future enemies of the US are not all incompetent.

The following are just snippets from the NRO article, the full article - and the article about the Indian AF exercises - present a fair discussion of the issues.

The US always prepares for the last war, and the last war has been against a bunch of low tech 3rd world insurgents. The US hasn't fought a relatively competent opponent since Vietnam - 40 years ago - and those lessons have been lost. The next war is likely to be against a real opponent, a China or Russia, or maybe a well financed and prepared muslim consortium. Its time the US pulls its head out, stops the fantasy that its invincible and gets to work preparing.

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http://www.nationalreview.com/artic...lanes-cant-defeat-our-enemies-mike-fredenburg

How did we end up with such pricey, brand-new fighters being unable to decisively defeat their opponents? United States air-power doctrine after the Korean War has emphasized “beyond visual range” (BVR) engagements. The idea: With sufficiently sophisticated missile technology, we can destroy enemy fighters from more than five miles away, long before the enemy can engage our aircraft. The cornerstone of BVR technology, large complex radars, required much bigger fighters to handle the aerodynamic challenges that bulky BVR radars present, as well as huge increases in power and cooling requirements. These larger fighters led to skyrocketing acquisition and maintenance costs. With the advent of stealth, the vision was expanded to include destroying enemy planes from behind a cloak, and costs skyrocketed again.

BVR HAS ALMOST NEVER WORKED
Starting with Desert Storm, there was an uptick in the number of kills achieved using the newer AMRAAM missiles, which are designed for relatively long range kills, but because neither the number of missiles used nor the range at which the BVR-capable missiles notched kills was recorded, it’s hard to reach any firm conclusions.

Historically, our pilots’ superior skills have allowed our big BVR fighters to dominate dogfights despite their large size, but those same pilots flying smaller, less-expensive fighters would still have dominated. In other words, the billions invested in large expensive BVR-focused planes and missiles, while highly correlated with U.S air dominance, was not the cause of that dominance. Going forward, assuming huge kill ratios predicated on BVR missile technology looks even less wise: We have no record of successfully using such technology against peer competitors with the training and technology to dramatically reduce BVR missile effectiveness (like, say, the Russians’ Su-35S). Both the United States and its competitors will continue to make large investments to improve BVR missiles and BVR-missile countermeasures. Since neither effort is likely to gain a decisive advantage, future battles will continue to involve close-range dogfights — where superior numbers of smaller affordable fighters are better than inferior numbers of heavier, less agile, less reliable BVR-focused fighters.

QUANTITY OVER QUALITY
It’s unrealistic to expect heavily outnumbered U.S. planes to consistently take down large numbers of enemy fighters at long ranges. The large technology lead the United States once held over other major air powers has nearly evaporated, and regaining our post-WWII lead is well-nigh impossible. Moreover, other air powers have studied and adopted U.S pilot-training methods, and that gap, once large, has narrowed as well. In 2004, for instance, U.S. F-15 pilots were unpleasantly surprised to find themselves on the wrong side of a 9-to-1 loss ratio in exercises with Indian Air Force pilots flying Russian-designed planes, including small but formidable MiG-21s. We should plan on Chinese and Russian pilots being equally competent.

[The link to the exercise in which USAF suffered 9-1 losses to the Indian AF http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/02/16...f_rewrote_the_rules_of_air_combat_33111.html]

STEALTH: ANOTHER PRICEY, UNPROVEN INVESTMENT
BVR’s kissing cousin, stealth, is also not the silver bullet it was portrayed to be 20-plus years ago, when development began on the Joint Strike Fighter (the F-35). In fact, counter-stealth technology is advancing and proliferating much more quickly than stealth technology. Recognizing this, the U.S. Navy is wisely hedging its bets by not being too reliant on stealth. Earlier this year, chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert noted the inevitable limits of stealth: “Let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air, disrupts molecules, and puts out heat — I don’t care how cool the engine can be, it’s going to be detectable.”

With the rapid proliferation of integrated air defenses capable of seeing and targeting stealthy airplanes, the decades-old vision of flying into the teeth of the integrated air defenses of our top competitors and attacking them with impunity is a fast-fading fantasy. A modest premium for cost-effective stealth probably makes sense, but a huge premium for maintenance-intensive stealth doesn’t.

 

Frankly, I'm not all that worried. Anytime either the U.S. or Israel has gone up against Russian built aircraft, in actual combat..not exercises...they smoke them.

The F-15 has an air-to-air combat record of 104 kills to 0 losses.

The U.S. has the only operational 5th generation fighter, and the JSF is 5th generation also.

We're still ahead of any potential opponents, even with the advancement of surface to air missile technology.

Fighters go to war with a contingency of support that military exercises don't reflect.

If the statement is made there is no such thing as invulnerability, of course this is true. Stealth means low observable, not invisible or invincible.

However in the event of an actual war, we will shoot down more of theirs than they will of ours..and that my friends...you can take to the bank.

 

That has always been known about stealth. It would give us an advantage for a brief period of time, but eventually our enemy would be able to detect them.

 

That's called complacency and hubris.

The F-15 has shot down.....who? Largely second rate pilots from second rate military's. And who was flying the majority of those F-15's? Israeli's, who have different tactics than the US, and heavily modify the aircraft to their requirements.

What you are doing is placing your trust in the equipment, not the tactics and people.

You are placing your trust in the past, and hoping the future looks like the past.

That's a recipe for disaster.

 

Why do you think they cannot already detect them? A nation does not have to have the ability to manufacture stealth aircraft to learn how to detect them. The US isn't the only nation to understand stealth either. I believe its in Ben Rich's book Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed, where he describes an engineer who first proposed the idea for a stealthy aircraft after reading a translated Soviet technical report on stealth methods, the result was the F-117. The Soviets could not build one at the time, but they understood stealth.

And a lot of people in the world certainly understand radar and IR and other detection technologies. Barring spying, it won't become obvious that an opponent has a counter stealth capability until its too late. Assuming we have an advantage against a real opponent is a mistake.

 

I'm not a fighter jock and have flown nothing faster or larger than a Cessna 172. My expertise are spotting naval gunfire and calling in close air support, with 12 months combat experience with Sub Unit One, ANGLICO actually doing it.

My opinion, it comes down to who's sitting in the cockpit, not so much what aircraft is being flown. During the Vietnam War you had WW ll era radial engine, propeller driven Douglas A-1 Skyraiders that shot down Mig-17's with cannon fire.

For a couple of decades now I've been saying that we need to go back and look at the National Security Act of 1947, how well has it worked in the past 48 years ? And social engineering of the U.S. military has to be stopped completely. Anyone who has ever walked through a military stockade or brig realize America has been lied too.

As you will see below, this if you are passed over for promotion three times you are out ("Up or Out") has degraded our military combat efficiency. I served before the all volunteer military, back when you had career privates and during the Vietnam War you could find a Marine rifle company commander who fought on Iwo Jima. You have officers who are excellent and the best of company grade officers but aren't up to being field grade. You have excellent soldiers and Marine riflemen or automatic riflemen but wouldn't make good squad leaders or platoon sergeants. Why (*)(*)(*)(*) can them ?

The following may be bias, I think the author is a Canuck, but I think he's right on.

The above author'as conclusions were.

 

We prepare for all kinds of wars, so I don't buy that we only prepare to fight the last war argument; most places in the world we could use WW I tech and overrun them in a week. as for our modern tech being detectable and no longer 'stealth', mostly that doesn't matter, because of our enemies can't do anything about them even if they do detect them, so that's not much of a concern.

Another example from WW II would be noteworthy, re the ME-262. Outran anything we had, but with less than 100 of them ever seeing combat, they didn't change the course of the war nor were they effective against a wave of 1,200 bombers and associated fighter escorts. Too little, too late, and with an endurance rating of some 30 to 90 minutes in the air, versus some 4.5 hours for a P-51 with internal fuel and some 8.5 hours with drop tanks, and bombers with even longer endurances, we could still bomb Germany with complete impunity. Germany produced over 1,400 ME-262's, yet couldn't operate but a fraction of those, so just merely having more advanced tech isn't nearly enough in most cases.

 

Get the pilots out of the planes and make the planes very fast and cheap and we might be onto something. Getting the pilots out would save tons of cash just on systems, and the planes would be as maneuverable as you want them to be. I'm sure we're almost there. The F-35 is a boondoggle.

 

I agree. I am a firm believer that its not the rifle, its the man holding the rifle that's most important. Give a good, determined man a weapon and he will use it to his best advantage and against his enemies biggest weakness, and get results.

I agree about social engineering also. The military is not a jobs program, there is no place in it for "diversity" and "sensitivity", or gender adjusted standards, or people that get offended by 4 letter words. You fight how you train, and if you spend half your time in diversity and sensitivity training....... And while GI Joe is in his sexual harassment class or wearing high heels for the "walk a day in her shoes", his future opponent is training to kill him.

I read your link, I particularly like this phrase : "They were young, aggressive, independent, and had a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement," that's the right mentality.

 

You saw that did you ?

I'm sure all of our enemies, present and future also saw that. I'm sure their balls grew some.

 

We are now in the age of drones. We already have swarms of (relatively) cheap airframes that can accept short range air to air missiles.

However drones and short range air to air missiles aren't that complicated. Our opponents will be able to create them soon enough. I'd expect them to have them already actually. And then you have the arrays of enemy radar systems and surface to air missiles.

What all that means is that if you want to fight on someone else's home turf you either need stealth, a willingness to accept significant losses, or a willingness and ability to more or less let Skynet fight our wars for us with airborne Terminators. We aren't willing as a nation to accept the second and we haven't gone with the third option yet, so that leaves stealth as our practical invasion option.

Note that countries more interested in defensive forces that will be fighting mostly over neutral or friendly airspace don't have the same issues and might well do better with less stealthy designs.

 

Why UAVs cannot replace fighter aircraft

 

I can't even begin to express my disgust over that, what is going through commanders minds that they think that was a good idea? And its been going on for years, so they actually believe its a positive action. I found an article from 2011 that Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, 172nd Infantry Brigade (since deactivated) donned red high heels and walked through Vilseck Germany, the CO was so proud of it I wonder if they awarded themselves a streamer on their guidon for it.

 

It's liberal social engineering.

If those Al Qaeda who are being held at Club Gitmo were made to wear red high heels, you would see monkeys flying out of the butts of the liberal congressmen and women in Congress.

 

I'm dubious of the multi-second lag. But in any case almost all of the issues raised stem from drones being operated by somebody on the other side of the planet. Those largely go away in a defensive situation. Just slap an iPhone on the front of the thing. I mean I'm sure they'd use some fancy hardened piece of technology, but the point with the iPhone is that the tech is there.

However the concerns are valid for an invasion. Hence why I indicated that stealth, accepting a loss of human life, and developing and deploying AI were our three options for invasions.

 

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

A few excerpts:

Amphibious Assault.

An amphibious assault involves the establishment of an LF
on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The organic capabilities of AFs, including air and
fire support, logistics, and mobility, allow them to gain access to an area by forcible entry.
The salient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift introduction of
sufficient combat power ashore to accomplish AF objectives. An amphibious assault may be
designed to comprise the initial phase of a campaign or major operation where the objective
is to seize and establish a military lodgment, e.g., ports, airfields, and advance bases; to
support the introduction of follow-on forces; to occur simultaneously with other operations
(e.g., Army airborne operations); or to deny freedom of movement by adversaries.
For more information on other types of forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint
Forcible Entry Operations...

Fire support

Fire support planning and
coordination in amphibious
operations are continuous
processes seeking timely
and appropriate application
of force to achieve the
objectives within the
operational area.

Properly planned and executed lethal and nonlethal
supporting fires are critical to the success of an
amphibious operation. AFs in the AOA or area of
operations normally require fire support for operations
such as beach reconnaissance, hydrographic survey,
removal of beach and underwater obstacles, and mine
countermeasures. The LF normally requires fire support
against shore targets before, during, and after the initial
landings. Once sufficient area is seized ashore, artillery
can be landed to provide additional fire support. Until
ground fire support means (e.g., mortars, rockets, and
cannon artillery) of the LF are landed and ready to
provide support, fire support is provided by close air
support, naval surface fire support, and, in limited cases,
direct and indirect fires from adjacent friendly forces...

Navy forces that are part of the ATF or support the ATF may include:

(a) ARGs. Forward-deployed ATFs are normally organized into ARGs with
three amphibious warfare ships (an amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
[LHA]/amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) [LHD], amphibious transport dock [LPD],
and dock landing ship [LSD]). These ships, each with its flight deck and well deck (with the
exception of LHA-6 and LHA-7), can, or will be able to embark, deploy, and land elements
of an LF in an assault by tiltrotor aircraft, helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles,
and by combinations of these methods. An ESG may be formed to provide additional
amphibious warfare expertise and advocacy in the event of more complex operations. ESGs
are prepared to provide a deployable, scalable, flag officer led command element (CE) with
task organized naval forces to fulfill CCDR and fleet commander operational requirements
up to Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)-sized amphibious operations. ESGs may be
supported by other forces (e.g., antisubmarine warfare [ASW] platforms or SUW platforms)
based on mission and CCDR requirements.

1. The LHD and LHA each has a full length flight deck and hangar to
support helicopter, tiltrotor, and vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft. Well decks
provide for ship-to-shore movement of landing craft and AAVs. The CATF and CLF and
their staffs are normally embarked on these ships.

2. The LPD lands troops, equipment, and supplies using landing craft,
AAVs operating from its well deck, and helicopters operating from its flight deck.

3. The LSD lands troops, equipment, and supplies using landing craft and
AAVs using its well deck. It has the ability to render limited docking and repair services to
small boats and craft...

Although LCACs are landing craft, their employment differs from
displacement landing craft because their speed is greater and they can traverse over
obstacles. However, they are often maintenance-intensive and can easily be damaged by
enemy fires. Limited operations using one or more LCAC groups may be conducted from as
far as 100 miles offshore. However, this distance approaches the maximum capability of the
craft and requires careful planning...

NSFS Support During the Landing

(1) Final Preparation of the Landing Area.
This fire support is designed to
destroy or neutralize adversary defense installations that might interfere with the approach
and final deployment of the AF and to assist in isolation of the landing area. NSFS is used to
support underwater demolition and MCM operations. Immediately before H-hour, major
emphasis is placed on the destruction and neutralization of adversary defenses most
dangerous to the successful landing of LF teams.

(2) Fires in Close Support of the Initial Assault. During the initial assault,
NSFS is continued on those adversary installations that could prevent the landing until the
safety of the leading waves requires these fires to be lifted. The final approach of the leading
waves of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, or helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft necessitates a
shift of the scheduled fires inland from the landing beaches or outward from the LZs. The
major portion of the fires delivered in close support of the landings consists of prearranged
fires delivered on a closely fixed schedule in the assault landing team’s zone of action.
Because the actual rate of advance and the estimated rate of advance may not coincide, the
CATF, through the SACC, retards or accelerates the movement of scheduled fires as
requested by the CLF. Close supporting fires continue until the shore fire control party with
the assault landing teams are in a position to conduct the fires of the assigned direct support
ships. At this time, the shore fire control party begins controlling fires.

(3) Deep Support Fires. Deep support fires usually are delivered by ships
assigned in general support. Each such ship is assigned a zone of responsibility that it covers
by fire and observation. Within assigned zones of responsibility and on a prearranged
schedule, ships neutralize known adversary targets, interdict adversary LOCs, attack targets
of opportunity, execute counterbattery fire, reinforce fires of direct support ships as directed,
and conduct missions assigned by the supported unit...

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_02.pdf

 

Sunnyside, I posted a link to JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02 not for you but for anyone who's curious how amphibious operations today are to be conducted.

A lot has changed over the past few decades not because the tactics are out dated but the resources are no longer available today to conduct large scale amphibious assaults like were able to be conducted forty or so years ago. Basically not enough amphibious ships, landing craft like the LCVP's, LCM's and no more AP's and no real naval ships able to conduct adequate naval shore bombardment and naval shore fire support for the troops who are ashore.

As you may have noticed, the SOP for what ships are assigned to providing NSFS today is one destroyer with one 5"/54 gun to each Marine rifle battalion and one destroyer under Regimental command.

Back when I served the SOP was one destroyer providing NSFS for every rifle battalion. Usually a Gearing class DD that had six 5"/38 guns.
One 8" gun cruiser with nine 8"/55 guns and a secondary gun battery of twelve 5"/38 guns assigned to each rifle regiment.
One Iowa class battleship with nine 16"/50 guns and a secondary battery of twelve 5"/38 guns assigned to division.

As you are aware and as Joint Publication 3-02 points out, we no longer have those resources available today.

We don't even have the amphibious ship to put a Marine Amphibious Force (division) ashore unless every amphibious ship in the U.S. Navy was able to put to sea, 1/2 of our amphibious ships are on the west coast while the other half are on the east coast. At best, a Marine Amphibious Brigade can conduct an amphibious assault. The U.S. Navy has never totally recovered from the massive drawdown of the 1970's. We lost all of our gun cruisers and a big chunk of our amphibious ships and landing craft.

 

One thing I doubt you had back then were the tiltroters mentioned in your document, which are in the process of replacing, as a primary means of coming ashore, landing craft and traditional helicopters. Hence the need or for stealth aircraft since those tiltroters may well be heading for a LZ well outside the range of naval bombardment.

 

If you read the National Security Act of 1947, why would Marines go beyond the range of naval gunfire ?

The Marine Corps are light naval infantry.
The Marine Corps doesn't win wars, they fight and win battles. It's the Army that suppose to win wars.
The Marine Corps is suppose to kick down the front door so the Army can mop up.
The Marine Corps attacks from the sea and establish a beach head so the Army can follow to move inland.

The mission of the Marine Corps remained unchanged except when they were used as soldiers during WW l in France and Gen. MacArthure had them kicking chi-com ass inland from the sea in Korea.

The Marine Corps is suppose to be going back to their roots, so they say ? Will Marines return to protecting naval bases, will we again see Marine Barrascks on every naval base, station, air station, depot, etc. like there use to be ? We already see that federal civilian police couldn't protect the Washington Navy Yard or protect soldiers at Fort Hood.

Will the law be followed and Marine Detachments will again serve on navy cruisers and aircraft carriers ?

There is a Catch-22 with in the National Security Act and it's why Marines were used beyond the beaches in Korea, Vietnam War, the first Gulf war, and the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Well, with the Osperys they're still going ship to shore. So it still seems in line with the original idea. And eventually they'll need to get a beach or harbor or something to bring in heavier equipment. It's just they may be initially touching down two hundred miles inland to set up an airhead/airbridge in some area that isn't mined, covered with machinegun nests, and with artillery zeroed in like you'd expect on a beach.

But beyond that for quite some time now the Marine's really have been treated more like Army units with somewhat different equipment and skills. I don't really see that changing anytime soon. Perhaps they should consider that it's been over a half century since the National Security Act of 1947 and consider what Marines should be in the 21st century.

 

To be accurate, it means a low RADAR return to the point (hopefully) that missiles are not able to lock onto the aircraft.

But that is something I have said over and over again in here many times. Even PATRIOT (a 30+ year old system) can "see" a stealth fighter. We simply do not get enough of a return to fire missiles at it. This is why for example on the opening days of the Gulf War you see millions of tracer rounds streaming out around Baghdad at the F-117s flying overhead, but no missiles. The guns can fire on any kind of RADAR return (oor non, relying on dumb luck), where as a missile will refuse to fire unless it gets enough of a return to lock onto.

 

You dont think the US military places trust in its tactics and people?

Who do you think does this more?

What military is better educated and more engaged in not only current tactics but developing new ones?

 

The US military is under the ultimate control of the Congress and President and is subject to politics just like every aspect of the government. Funding, base closings, acquisition programs, promotions at the flag officer level, all kinds of aspects of the military are heavily influenced by politicians who put their personal advancement over the status of the military. That's always been the case, but with a tight budget and such expensive weapons that eat up huge blocks of the budget the emphasis on weapons (money to political constituents) is overshadowing the emphasis on people and training.

Complicating matters is that social engineering seems to have priority over military readiness. Under Obama and the "progressives", gender equality and gay rights trump the ability to actually defeat the enemy. Even their war on religion is impacting moral.

So to answer your first question, I think most of the military personnel still has their head in the right place and understands what it takes to win a war particularly since so many have been at war for so long. But its being corrupted from the top down.

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Israel has a top notch military, mainly because they feel like they are literally under the gun, but they are not a global force and focus on their unique situation.

 

Thats a constant complaint I hear from military, present or former. PC crap, especially hoisted by politicians is insanely frustrating.
I'd love to see our military get more money for training, however I also think that we still generally hold an edge in training, and that the comparatively few geopolitical adversaries also have the same problems with affording the training.

I dont know what the flight time is for Russia or China, but I suspect we still hold an edge there.

 

OODA is just a paradigm to control information in a flow - it would be more efficient for a computer to manage most of the activity. I'd say the pilotage will be automated, but the guidance will have pilot in the loop - which just means a simplified interface to key decision points and ignore the rest. The drone operator will still have their OODA loop to process procedure appropriately, it will just be less focused on flying the aircraft and more on tactical position, sensor utilization and weapon employement. Such that a WVR knight fight would have not pilot input at all, except target being engaged. Other parameters are known and the pilot monitors the situation accordingly. Which overall means less data transfer but it depends on where the sensors are located and what information is being worked. It would make more sense to have drone operators in a local airborne asset IMO, where communication could even be laser up to a high altitude platform and back down again to the asset, one of many in a distributed interface network across technologies to put in some decent layering of redundancy.