I wish Mullah Omar would get hold of Obama and cut his head off. Allahu akbar.
I wish Mullah Omar would get hold of Obama and cut his head off. Allahu akbar.
Last edited by Horhey; Mar 06 2012 at 05:58 PM.
Yeah see, it's a much different situation when these measures are used against popular uprisings trying to topple their tyrannical governments. The manual does acknowledge that these governments are corrupt and repressive. It even suggests provoking the insurgents to attack civillians to make the government look like the good guys for a change.
Mushroom even posted this part earlier:
So one of the strategies was to try and provoke the rebels into "attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating."When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages to accept the government's CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating.
To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions that inspire fight-to-the-death emotions in the peasant. The village or town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some faraway irrelevant government.
This strategy wouldnt have worked anyways. It's like how they tried to push Nicaragua into the hands of the Soviets to create pretext for putting US troops on the ground because they didnt think the Contras were gonna get the job done.
Last edited by Horhey; Mar 07 2012 at 05:23 AM.
Last edited by Horhey; Mar 07 2012 at 05:40 AM.
From 1975-1999, "US political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor."
From The National Security Archive's declassified US documents:
[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzYcQUQgcpw"]Clinton Questioned on his Death Squad Killings in East Timor[/ame]East Timor truth commission finds U.S. "political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation"
Report estimates 100-180,000 Timorese killed or starved 1975-1999
"Responsibility" chapter published on Web by National Security Archive
The final report of East Timor's landmark Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) has found that U.S. "political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation" of East Timor from 1975 to 1999, according to the "Responsibility" chapter of the report posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive, which assisted the Commission with extensive documentation.
In 1996, the Clinton administration planned to sell F-16 Jet Fighters to General Suharto in order to "help bolster stability in East Asia".
The Los Angeles Times reports:
The Clinton administration reaffirmed Thursday that it plans to go ahead with the sale of nine F-16 jet fighters to Indonesia, despite the country's human rights violations .
The decision comes over the objections of human rights advocates--and some U.S. lawmakers--who said that the White House should cancel the sale to protest Indonesia's continued subjugation of East Timor, where Indonesian troops reportedly have committed massacres.
Senior administration officials have insisted that Washington still believes the sale of the jet fighters would be in U.S. interests because it would help bolster stability in East Asia.
U.S. Military aid to Indonesia during the Clinton years is about $150 million.
In 1997 the Pentagon was still training Kopassus units, in violation of the intent of congressional legislation. In the face of this record, the US government lauded "the value of the years of training given to Indonesia’s future military leaders in the US and the millions of dollars in military aid for Indonesia".
The Gaurdian: US trained butchers of Timor
Exclusive: Washington trained death squads in secret while Britain has spent £1m helping Indonesian army
Indonesian military forces linked to the carnage in East Timor were trained in the United States under a covert programme sponsored by the Clinton Administration which continued until last year.
The US programme, codenamed 'Iron Balance', was hidden from legislators and the public when Congress curbed the official schooling of Indonesia's army after a massacre in 1991. Principal among the units that continued to be trained was the Kopassus Ð an elite force with a bloody history Ð which was more rigorously trained by the US than any other Indonesian unit, according to Pentagon documents passed to The Observer last week.
Kopassus was built up with American expertise despite US awareness of its role in the genocide of about 200,000 people in the years after the invasion of East Timor in 1975, and in a string of massacres and disappearances since the bloodbath. Amnesty International describes Kopassus as 'responsible for some of the worst human rights violations in Indonesia's history'.
The Pentagon documents Ð obtained by the US-based East Timor Action Network and Illinois congressman Lane Evans Ð detail every exercise in the covert training programme, conducted under a Pentagon project called JCET (Joint Combined Education and Training). They show the training was in military expertise that could only be used internally against civilians, such as urban guerrilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, sniper marksmanship and 'psychological operations'.
Specific commanders trained under the US programme have been tied to the current violence and to some of the worst massacres of the past 20 years, including the slaughter at Kraras in 1983 and at Santa Cruz in 1991. The US-trained commanders include the son-in-law of the late dictator General Suharto, Prabowo Subianto, and his mentor, General Kiki Syahnakri Ð the man appointed last week by the so-called 'reform' government as commissioner for martial law in East Timor.
American sponsorship of the Indonesian regime began as a matter of Cold War ideology, in the wake of defeat in Vietnam. The left-wing movement in East Timor was feared by Jakarta and seen by the US as an echo of those in southern Africa and of Salvador Allende's government in Chile. Jakarta's harassment of the Timor government and the invasion of 1975 were duly encouraged by the United States.
The training of Indonesia's officer corps peaked during the mid-Eighties. In 1990 a former official at the US Embassy in Jakarta cabled the State Department to say US sponsorship had been 'a big help to the (Indonesian) army. They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands'.
Amnesty International's East Timor country specialist, Deborah Sklar, traces the regime's 'over-reliance on thuggish military operations' as being due to the demands of the foreign investment community and even from the World Bank.
She cites a blueprint called The East Asian Miracle, written by US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, in which he urges governments to 'insulate' themselves from 'pluralist pressures' and to suppress trade unions. This, she says, became a primary Kopassus role during the years of training by the United States.
'If the US,' says Sklar, 'has supplied to the Indonesians equipment that has been concerned in the perpetration of human rights abuses, then that is an outrage.'
The UN Security Council ordered Indonesia to withdraw, but that was an empty gesture. As UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan explained in his memoirs:
Suharto remained "our kind of guy", as the Clinton administration described him, untill he commited his first real crime, in 1998: dragging his feat on IMF orders and losing control over the population, though some like Suharto's longtime advocate Paul Wolfowitz, continued to support him. Suharto's fall from grace follows a familiar course: Mobutu, Saddam Hussein, Duvalier, Marcos, Somoza, etc. The usual reasons are disobedience or loss of control.The United States wished things to turn out as they did and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.
Last edited by Horhey; Mar 07 2012 at 06:18 AM.
The reasons Washington strongly supported General Suharto's genocide campaign in East Timor were explained by Clinton administration officials to the New York Times:
The New York Times: Why Suharto Is In and Castro Is Out
Administration officials said the treatment of Mr. Castro, Mr. Jiang and Mr. Suharto was driven by very different litmus tests, a potent mix of power politics and emerging markets.
Mr. Suharto, who is sitting on the ultimate emerging market: some 13,000 islands, a population of 193 million and an economy growing at more than 7 percent a year. The country remains wildly corrupt and Mr. Suharto's family controls leading businesses that competitors in Jakarta would be unwise to challenge. But Mr. Suharto, unlike the Chinese, has been savvy in keeping Washington happy. He has deregulated the economy, opened Indonesia to foreign investors and kept the Japanese, Indonesia's largest supplier of foreign aid, from grabbing more than a quarter of the market for goods imported into the country.
So Mr. Clinton made the requisite complaints about Indonesia's repressive tactics in East Timor, where anti-Government protests continue, and moved right on to business, getting Mr. Suharto's support for market-opening progress during the annual Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Osaka in mid-November.
"He's our kind of guy," a senior Administration official who deals often on Asian policy, said the other day.
Last edited by Horhey; Mar 07 2012 at 06:16 AM.