Eight women say Charlie Rose sexually harassed them — with nudity, groping and lewd calls

GOP Rep. Writing Bill To Prevent Lawmakers From Pulling a “John Conyers”
“Settlements paid with tax dollars should not be kept secret. Members of Congress cannot be allowed to use the American people’s money as a personal slushfund to cover wrongdoing. I’m working on legislation to unseal settlement records, bar use of tax dollars to pay claims against members & staff, prohibit members from using office budgets to camouflage payments (a Conyers rule) & require reimbursement of the taxpayer,” tweeted DeSantis on Wednesday.

 

He needs to make it retroactive.

 

DeSantis for President 2020!!

 

That can be difficult.
No...ex post facto Law shall be passed.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 3.

A law that is ex post facto—literally, after the fact—is one that criminally punishes conduct that was lawful when it was done. It is an aspect of the fundamental maxim, nulla poena sine lege: there can be no punishment without law—in this case, without preexisting law. Despite the fact that the prohibition against such laws had worked its way into English law, Parliament had, nonetheless, claimed the right to enact ex post facto laws in the form of bills of attainder against unpopular groups and persons. In addition, prior to the Constitutional Convention, some states themselves had passed ex post facto laws. (The prohibition of ex post facto state laws is found in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1.)

Nevertheless, opposition to ex post facto laws was a bedrock principle among the Framers. In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton noted that "the subjecting of men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law" is among "the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." Thomas Jefferson noted in an 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson "the sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right."

In Philadelphia, the Framers debated the issue vigorously. Some thought an explicit ban on ex post facto laws an absolute necessity. Others, such as Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, echoed the natural law tradition and "contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot then be necessary to prohibit them." James Wilson declared that the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the state constitutions had been ineffective and would be likewise "useless" in the national constitution. Hugh Williamson then pointed to North Carolina's prohibition of ex post facto laws. He acknowledged that the prohibition had been violated, but argued that "it has done good there & may do good here, because the Judges can take hold of it." The delegates then approved the clause, seven states to three.

Later, James Dickinson reported that, on examining Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, he found that "the terms ‘ex post facto' related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently restrain the states from retrospective laws in civil cases and that some further provision for this purpose would be requisite." After the Committee of Style had reported the ex post facto law clauses in their current form, George Mason of Virginia moved to strike the prohibition against ex post facto laws because the clause might apply to civil laws "and no Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them in Civil cases." Elbridge Gerry seconded the motion because he wanted a clearer statement that prohibition did in fact apply to "Civil cases." Mason's motion was unanimously rejected.

The Court addressed the issue of the scope of the clause in one of its earliest constitutional decisions. Calder v. Bull, decided in 1798, involved a determination by the Connecticut legislature that a judicial decree should be set aside and a new trial held regarding a contested will. Without dissent, the Court held that the Connecticut legislature's action was not an ex post facto law forbidden under Article I, Section 10. Justice Samuel Chase defined ex post facto laws as:

1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.
Chase also made the point that, had the ex post facto law clauses barred all retroactive civil laws, the prohibition on the impairment of contracts by states (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1) and on uncompensated takings by the federal government (the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause) would have been unnecessary.

Although some believe that the question of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause had not been squarely presented in Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court adopted and upheld Justice Chase's position in Carpenter v. Pennsylvania (1855). Since that time, a few commentators and two Justices, William Johnson in Satterlee v. Matthewson (1829) and Clarence Thomas in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (199, have voiced doubt over the accepted rule that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal legislation. In Apfel, citing Justice Joseph Story, Thomas contended that the Ex Post Facto Clause, even more clearly than the Takings Clause, reflects the principle that retrospective laws are "generally unjust." He continued:

Since Calder v. Bull,...this Court has considered the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply only in the criminal context. I have never been convinced of the soundness of this limitation, which in Calder was principally justified because a contrary interpretation would render the Takings Clause unnecessary....In an appropriate case, therefore, I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny to determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The weight of precedent and scholarly opinion, however, supports Justice Chase's view.

While the Supreme Court has hewn to the position that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits criminal penalties only, it has also applied the clause in civil cases where criminal penalties are disguised as civil disabilities. As the Court has said, "it is the effect, not the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto." Weaver v. Graham (1980).

When undertaking this inquiry, courts assess whether the ostensibly civil fine or penalty is penal in nature. As Justice Felix Frankfurter articulated the inquiry:

The mark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated punishment for past acts. The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profession. De Veau v. Braisted(1960).

The issue of what constitutes "punishment" involves other clauses of the Constitution as well. For example, recent interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment may have implications for the Ex Post Facto Clause. In United States v. Halper (1989), the Supreme Court said that if "civil proceedings...advance punitive as well as remedial goals," they do not constitute punishment that is prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. Ursery (1996), the Court found that confiscating the home of an individual convicted for growing marijuana was a "civil remedial sanction" rather than a civil penalty. On the other hand, the Court has found that an imposed forfeiture constitutes a punitive sanction under the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause. United States v. Bajakajian (199.

Most recently, in Smith v. Doe (2003), the Court (by a 6–3 decision) rejected the claim that Alaska's sex offender registration and notification law constituted retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause (of the analogue Article I, Section 10, Clause 1). The Court focused on the legislature's "intention" and applied the following analytical framework:

If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it civil. Because we ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.

A possible problem with the Court's current interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is the fact that many criminal laws could be rephrased as civil. As currently understood, the Ex Post Facto Clause thus guards against only the most severe use of the legislature's power to make laws retroactive. They do so effectively where personal liberty is at issue. But the clause is of little use to those who are aggrieved by most forms of retroactive civil legislation, which frequently affect property rights of one form or another.

The clause applies only to criminal statutes, not judicial decisions having a retroactive effect. Retroactive judicial decisions, however, can be challenged under the Due Process Clause. See Rogers v. Tennessee (2001). Retroactive procedural statutes that work to deny a defense, bar the practice of law, increase punishment, or increase the likelihood of conviction may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Cummings v. Missouri (1867); Ex parte Garland (1867); Carmell v. Texas (2000). In Stogner v. California (2003), the Court struck down a California law that revived prosecutions for sexual abuse of children after the statute of limitations had expired.

A statutory increase in punishment is also an impermissible ex post facto law. Collins v. Youngblood (1990). The clause prohibits, for example, applying new sentencing guidelines to a defendant who committed the crime prior to their promulgation, Miller v. Florida (1987); or canceling early-release credits after they have been awarded, Lynce v. Mathis (1997); but not a retroactive decrease in the availability of parole hearings, California Department of Corrections v. Morales(1995); nor a change in the place of trial, Cook v. United States (1891); nor deportation, Mahler v. Eby (1924). The Court found no increase in punishment in a change of method of execution from hanging to electrocution, Malloy v. South Carolina (1915); or in imposing civil commitment on a sexual predator after sentence, Kansas v. Hendricks (1997).

http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/63/ex-post-facto

 

How about Matt Lauer rape-button helmets for the next Women's March?

 

Black, female ex-Charlie Rose staffer suggests racism because he didn't harass her.

Charlie Rose's former staffers lodged their complaints in the pages of Esquire earlier this month. Ms. Rebecca Carroll wrote:

[W]hile many of us on staff were subject to Charlie's unsolicited shoulder massages and physical intimidation, as he towered above us at a height over six feet tall, the women Charlie preferred and preyed upon – at least that I witnessed – were white. It was an environment that all but erased me, while simultaneously exploiting me as a black woman.

I felt like an exotic anomaly he could move around the chessboard at his whim – and I was supposed be grateful for it.

So, being left alone was offensive? With perfect knowledge of Rose's mind and soul, she seems convinced that it was a racial affront. She expanded on that theme:

For white men, that means not just being the richest, most powerful person in the room – but also preying upon and ultimately capturing the most desirable woman in the room, too.

In America, the most desirable woman in the room – the most sacred, coveted, enshrined woman – has always been the white woman. As a survivor of sexual assault myself, I know that we women of color are victims as much, if not more, than white women; we are also less likely to come forward with our stories of abuse because there's so much more at stake.

How does being "a survivor of sexual assault" impart knowledge of the rates of sexual assault for black and white women?

 

Gale King: I Feel "Sick to My Stomach" Over New Charlie Rose Accusations

Sorry, I have to ask: Are you really saying you had no idea this was going on?

Or is this an attempt at insulating oneself from accusations of complicity?


CBS This Morning

✔@CBSThisMorning

Replying to @CBSThisMorning

MORE: The Washington Post reports 27 women, include 14 CBS News employees, said Rose sexually harassed them over a more than 30 year period. The paper alleges over that time, Rose's behavior was "flagged to managers at the network as early as 1986 and as recent as April 2017."

5:15 AM - May 3, 2018

27? Over a 30 year period? Management knew? And these are the clowns running the GOP War On Women Meme? Who erupted in outrage with Romney said he has "Binders full of Women" as if he was keeping actual women, rather than their contact information in employment referral binders?

Twenty-seven women is a lot of women. It's difficult to believe they all kept this silent, or that management didn't hear rumors or even direct reports.

The Washington Post report:

The new allegations follow an earlier Post report on Rose's behavior at his namesake PBS program, in which eight women accused the TV star of making lewd phone calls, walking around naked in their presence, or groping their breasts, buttocks or genital areas. Rose issued an apology. His PBS show was canceled and he was fired from CBS News.

The new allegations against Rose date to 1976, when, according to a former research assistant, he exposed his penis and touched her breasts in the NBC News Washington bureau where they worked.

Although many of these women are anonymous to avoid retaliation (retaliation for telling #TheirTruth -- in a liberal industry? Shocking!), some put their name under their accusations:

"I had been there long enough to know that it was just the way things went," said Sophie Gayter, now 27, who worked at "60 Minutes" in 2013 when, she said, Rose groped her buttocks as they walked down an office hallway to a recording studio. "People said what they wanted to you, people did what they wanted to you," Sophie Gayter said of her time at "60 Minutes."
Note Gayter is accusing Charlie Rose, but she's also saying "people" -- including other people than Charlie Rose, one assumes -- did this.

A Culture of Harassment?

The first instance identified by The Post in which a CBS News employee said a manager was told of Rose's conduct was in 1986, when he was filling in as an anchor on "CBS Morning News."

There, Annmarie Parr, a 22-year-old news clerk, delivered a script to Rose. He had made "lewd, little comments" about her appearance before, Parr said, but that day Rose took it further. "Annmarie, do you like sex?" she said he asked her. "Do you enjoy it? How often do you like to have sex?" She said she laughed nervously and left.

Parr said she reported Rose's comments to her boss -- a senior producer whom she declined to name -- and said she didn’t want to be alone with Rose. The producer laughed, Parr said, and told her, 'Fine, you don’t have to be alone with him anymore.'

That same year, seven women sued CBS claiming that the workplace on the network's overnight broadcast "Nightwatch" was "offensive and hostile" to female employees.

Rose wasn't named in the lawsuit but he was a co-anchor of the show. So, do the math.