The Arabs were wrong to reject UN "181". Is this really so?

This thread was triggered by the following quote and to keep the previous thread from going seriously off-topic:

I think that this is such a common view expressed on this forum that it deserves analysis.

What occurs to me initially are two main issues:

Issue 1) Were the Arabs justified in NOT accepting UN "181"? I mean, forgetting about our luxury of hindsight. Why should they NOT have accepted it?

Issue 2) If they had accepted UN "181" what might they have known which could tell then that all might not be Disneyland in the future?

 

klipkap, et al,

You have to look through the 1947 eyes of the Mandatory Power (UK), the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Arab League, and the reconstituted Arab Higher Committee; not to mention the Allied Powers, and the UN. In late-1947/1948, one perspective was: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly [GA/RES/181(II)] and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein." (SOURCE: A/AC.21/9 S/676 16 February 1948) Further:

(OBSERVATION)

By the late 1920's and '30's, the Arab Palestinian perceived the Jewish National Home undertaking as the cause of depriving the Arab Palestinian of their natural right of establishing an independent government the same as Mesopotamia (later Iraq) and the Hedjaz (later incorporated into Saudi Arabia). They had concluded that self-government would be granted to the Jewish people in Palestine when the Jewish people attained sufficient numbers and were able to sustain self-government. Although there were a number of different ways in which a Jewish National Home might be implemented, the Arab Palestinian assumed that self-government was the objective. There was a growing resentment in the Arab Palestinian due to political disappointments which they attributed to the favoritism of the Allied Powers and the Mandatory towards Jewish self-rule/government.

The perception of the "irreconcilable differences" between the Arab Palestinian and the Jewish People in Palestine, was the driver behind the concept of an additional Partition; separating the two belligerents - thereby preserving peace.

It should be also noted that the Arab Palestinian saw the remainder of Palestine (The former Mandate, less the Jordanian Carve-out) as exclusively theirs, for the creation of yet another Arab Kingdom. They saw "land ownership" (a real estate concept) as intrinsically entwined with self-rule/government and sovereignty (mutually exclusive concepts in the western world). It was a common theme to arise over and over again in the next seven decades. This real estate theme, coupled with the "invasion by foreigners" concept were the backbone behind the infrastructure of the argument that there should be no Jewish State. And that is exactly what the Partition Plan was proposing to solve the "irreconcilable differences;" a "Jewish State" and an "Arab State."

It again should be noted that the concept of nationalism and the potential for both a "Jewish State" and an "Arab State" was not new. It reached back to the Aggreement between HRH the Emir Faisal and Chairman Weizmann (1919)

In the very beginning (nearly a century ago - 94 years), the two-state idea was evolving ("in the development of the Arab State and Palestine").

It was clear:

(COMMENT)

• Issue 1) Were the Arabs justified in NOT accepting UN "181"? I mean, forgetting about our luxury of hindsight. Why should they NOT have accepted it?

ANSWER: There was no question in the mind of the Arab that the option for a quick conflict to dissolve the Partition was their best option. With the Arab Palestinian outnumbering the Jewish Immigrants nearly 2:1, and with the additional combined forces of the Arab League (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt), they thought there was no way they could lose the war. With a quick demise of the Jewish State, all would be solved. And the alternative Arab Plan could be (at their discretion) implemented.​

• Issue 2) If they had accepted UN "181" what might they have known which could tell then that all might not be Disneyland in the future?

ANSWER: This is a hypothetical. If the Arab Higher Committee (a proxy of the Arab League) had accepted, no one knows what the future might have brought. But the prospects for an immediate war and the refugee issue (less the probable Jewish Flight) may have been averted.​

The Arab cause was not one of self-determination. It was all about power and influence; a chance to install yet another Arab strongman.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

They were justified in not accepting the plan because the plan was extremely unfair to them.

 

Many thanks for an impressive contribution. It will take me a while to assimilate it, so permit me to respond in sections.

The claim was that if the Arabs had accepted "181" all would now have been hunky-dory. My query revolved around this acceptance.
What you posted in the first section was very interesting. However, I am intrigued to ascertain why you believe what happened in February 1948 was pertinent to a decision that they made in November 1947. And I am not sure that it indeed links, because it has to do with Arab defiance AFTER the discussion and vote on "181". The die was by then cast.

What instead intrigues me most is how the following sequence of agreements and promises impacted on each other and how the entire sequence might have influenced the thinking of the Aab countries by the time it came to "181".

# The McMahon.Hussein correspondence. Were the Arabs reasonable in believing that this had promised Palestine to them.
# The Balfour agreement. Was this reneging on "McMahon"? Did it contain a fatal flaw? Does the "Churchill" White paper throw light on this?
# What impact did Sykes-Picot have on Arab trust when they found out about it?
# Were the Mandate reactions to Arab complaints about the implementation of the Mandate in line with 'Balfour'.
# What should the Arabs have read into the Peel commission findings? And what did the Second British White paper do, if anything, to ameliorate intense Arab suspicion by now.
# Then the Mandate holder decided that the mandate was a failure and sought UN advice on what to do. What was the implication of "181" being simply advisory? Were there flaws in the process? Did the Arabs point these out and what was the reaction?

That is how my mind works to explain Aran reaction in November 1947. One cannot divorce that reaction from history and the Arab experiences, observations of how the "West" had acted, and how much trust had been cultivated from the time that they complied with the McMahon understanding, through to the approval of "181".

 

klipkap; et al,

No, not exactly is it the case that the (as you say) "the die was by then cast."

Please consider the implications of the following that were included in the Resolution:

(OBSERVATION)

The Resolution had, imbedded with it, a self-destruct mechanism in two forms:

First, the Preamble says, in effect, that if the Security Council determined that implementation was a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, it could simply "not implement" the resolution and it would die on the table.

Second, the Resolution was not binding to either party (the Jewish Agency or the Arab Higher Committee) unless accepted. But either could accept individual the offer presented by the Partition Plan.

• Part I, Para 4: If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.
  
• Part I, Chapter 4, Para 2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.
  
• Part i, Chapter 4, Section F: When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

If accepted, there was a time delay mechanism (poison pill clauses):

• 19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.
  
• 20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.
  
• 21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

The Resolution was not automatically enforceable. There were safeguards and terminators in place. Until the First Monthly Progress Report to the UNSC, there is no real record of either an acceptance or a declination by either side. The implementation process by the United Nations Palestine Commission had barely started. In fact, it wasn't until January 1948, that the official texts of the Resolution had been formally distributed. But in that first month of meeting (leading to the February '48 citation, supra) we observe the first of the fatal Arab errors.

This took the Arab Higher Committee out of play, and allowed the Jewish Agency an unobstructed pathway to Independence. Had the Arab Higher Committee accepted the resolution, and participated in the implementation process, they could have likely ensnared and entangled the process for a considerable period --- maybe even to the point the resolution would become mute.

But, the way in which the Arab Higher Committee approached the problem, made it all but assured that it would be implemented. Since they gagged themselves, there was no opposing voice.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

I believe that, in the context of the OP, the die had indeed been cast. The Arab states had as a fact voted against resolution “181” That vote was the “die”. What happened afterwards could not undo that vote.

I looked for this option of “non-implementation” in the text of the resolution that you quoted, but could not find it. It allows for the Security Council to decide what measures are necessary to maintain peace and to apply non-force measures so as to achieve this …. Nothing more.

Again I do not find that in the text of resolution “181”. In fact the word “binding” is never used, and the word “accept” is only used once and not in the context that you indicate.

In fact, UNGA resolution is a recommendation to Britain as the Mandate power. It is not an instruction to anyone, to be adhered to or not.

In fact, they had a very good reason NOT to accept the resolution. In the discussions leading up to the vote, the Arabs questioned the legality of “181” and requested that it be subject to legal opinion from the International Court of Justice. This was denied to them in violation of the Law that governed the Mandate of the time, that is, the Mandate for Palestine:

The President of the General Assembly condoned the breaking of this international law governing the Mandate (which only expired in May 194 by allowing a Sub-Committee to decide whether the law should be respected!!

Unfortunately, interesting though it is, much of the rest of your post follows similar lines and does not indicate any reasons why the Arab countries should have accepted the resolution, the subject of this thread, and hence is drifting off-topic.

I do not dispute its value in a greater context. Perhaps a future thread can discuss whether Israel adhered to "181" in its unilateral Declaration of Independence, and whether the Arab states were forever barred from the provisions of "181" because they found the resolution itself to be illegal as was the "implementation" thereof.

 

(COMMENT)

I copied it once, I'll do it again.

(COMMENT)

Under the rule of the Charter, only the UNSC can make a binding resolution.

Recommendations are non-binding. The term recommendation is used - not the impact (non-binding).

The phrase "Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions" is often referred to as the "binding."

(COMMENT)

That is correct. It is not binding or directing anyone but the Security Council. Resolution 181(II) is an "offer," in which the UNGA requested (as opposed to directed) the UNSC to implement. The parties could accept or decline. In this case Jewish Agency accepted and the Arab Higher Committee declined.

Relative to the applicability to the Mandatory Power, I go into that below. But the Mandatory Power was altered somewhat in mid-1947 (before the Resolution).

(COMMENT)

First, the Arab Higher Committee never took the matter before the ICJ.

Second, the Mandate was subordinate to the will of the International Trustee System (ITS) (the successor agency to the Mandate Commission, Para 1a, Article 77, UN Charter). The ITS was a subsidiary to the UN (Article 75 of the UN Charter). All legal disputes go to the ICJ, they are not litigated in a "sub-committee."

Third: While the Mandate did not expire until May 1948, the Mandatory (UK) had, by July 1947, handed the problem over to the UN for a decision. The Mandate of Palestine was a Class "A" Mandate and an Article 82 Strategic Area. Under the rules of the UN Charter, a Security Council Matter.

Please consider the following:

Relative to the Israeli adherence to its Declaration, it was done in coordination of the UNSC, the Mandatory Power, and as predicted in accordance with the implementation plan approved by the Security Council. GA/RES/181(II) was the vehicle, but the implementation was up to the Security Council.

I'm a bit confused as to your allegation that "breaking of this international law governing the Mandate." What particular law was broken by whom? Can you give me the specifics?

Most Respectfully,
R

 

Rocco, the OP posed the challenge - "Why should the Arabs have accepted UNGA "181". You have posted a vast amount of quotations and replied to you own quotes but don't appear to be interested in the topic of the thread. I am beginning to suspect that you are attempting to dilute the OP question with irrelevant verbiage. You never make any link to the OP question, you just drop in a piece of random historical data and then ask us “to consider it”. To consider it with what goal?
Let me give you just one example …. And there are many.

In your post #2 you ask me to consider the implication of a quote that you provide, without providing any indication as to how this related to the stated theme of the thread. That quote provided certain responsibilities for the Security Council. What did that provide as a reason why the Arabs should have accepted “181”?

But not only that, you then go off down an off-topic track, claiming that “181” had a self-destruct mechanism in it. So what. Why should the Arabs have accepted it if you are correct that it had a self-destruct mechanism in it?

You continue to claim that the Security Council was responsible for the implementation of “181”, and not the Palestine Commission. I dispute that. Part 1 Section B of “181” is absolutely clear on this. The Security Council was granted a “guiding” role but not an executive one, other than for the maintenance of peace which we discussed:

But this is all irrelevant to the OP. It provides no information as to why the Arabs should have accepted “181”.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The closest that you came to providing a reason was in your claim that a two-state solution was catered for in the 1919 Faisal-Weizman agreement. Indeed, it was. But what you failed to mention was that Faisal agreed as long as the Jewish state of Palestine was subject to a peculiar caveat:
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9...ced00673d1f?OpenDocument#sthash.Zwnb133G.dpuf

And that Memorandum demanded that the Arab states obtained their independence in compliance McMahon-Hussein commitments. Now THAT is one HUGE caveat to the meaning of”a two-state solution”. When that failed to happen, Faisal considered the agreement moot. UNSCOP, in its pre-“181” analysis did not regard the agreement as valid.

So even the Faisal-Weizman agreement of 1919 was no motivation for the Arabs to have accepted “181” in November 1947.

 

klipkap, et al,

I apologize.

(COMMENT)

Again, if the Arab Higher Committee had accepted the offer, then they would have been directly involved in the implementation process which they could have affect change --- or --- delayed the implementation indefinitely. After all, that was their objective.

(COMMENT)

No. The implementation was the responsibility of the Security Council, both from the standpoint of the implementation of the Resolution and the alteration or change in the Trustee Status. You will notice that the reports of the Commission go to the Security Council (oversight).

(COMMENT)

I was responding to your commentary and challenge, item by item. Again, I apologize, I see that I am not communicating with you. I will refrain from further comment after this posting.

(FINAL COMMENT)

Not "invalid." It was overtaken by events. However, independently, HRH Emir Faisal did get his Kingdom.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

Hindsight:
The arabs should have accepted 181 because acceptance couldn't have been any worse than the 70 year long clustermuck that transpired since.

Contemporary (194:

The arabs couldn't/wouldn't accept it because they are muslim. A pious muslim does not yield any part of the ummah to infidels, even if they are people of the book. this aspect of Islam was one of the driving motivations of the objective of "liberation of all of historic palestine".

 

Please do not withdraw, Rocco. For the first time in ages I am having fun debating with someone who knows the value of facts and documentation.

Rocco, I quoted the text from “181” which showed that the Palestine Commission was responsible for the administration of Palestine. Since this is the key portion of the implementation of “181”, I cannot accept as a valid rebuttal that you just say “No. The implementation was the responsibility of the Security Council.” I showed you that the Palestine Commission was to be under the guidance of the Security Council, but nothing more. I apologise for this somewhat abrupt rejection, so I will try to substantiate it.

Here are some more references to the Commmission from that text:

You instead used that paragraph to suggest that the Security Council was responsible for the implementation of “181”. I put it to you that in normally accepted English, that is not the case.

But let us test my understanding of English (my mother tongue) by examining “181” further.

Since this termination notice would trigger certain phases of the implementation of “181” this is a yet further indication that the Commission was responsible for the implementation. But let us continue.

Yet another positive tick for the Commission being responsible for implementation. Let us test further …. This one is rather unequivocal

That seems to be a slam-dunk on our issue.

Note: The Commission; not the Security Council.

Note: The Commission; not the Security Council.

Note: Even where the military is concerned this is not the Security Council’s implementation task.

Note: NOT the Security Council

So, I hope that you can see why a “No” was insufficient rebuttal.

 

Klipklap, et al,

OK, one more comment.

You are confusing the extension and transfer powers of the Mandatory, which is still a UN Security Council issue, and the implementation of the Partition Plan, which is also a UN Security Council issue.

First case is that the Powers of the Mandatory from the UK (under the old Mandate) to the UN Palestine Commission (UNPC). As the old Mandatory withdraws, the Administration of Palestine transfers gradually to the UNPC. Any such change falls under the guidance and responsibility of the UNSC as a Charter Function (Article 83, Para 1, UN Charter). A Mandatory Power is "ALWAYS" subordinate to higher authority. The Mandatory Power is merely an action arm of the UN and the Security Council via the International Trustee System. It takes and follows that guidance.

The implementation of the Partition Plan [a General Assembly (GA) adopted plan recommended by the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)] is spelled out in:

While A/RES/181(II) 29 November 1947 is considered the "principle activation document," it is by no means the only document that discusses the scope and intentions of the mission and task at hand. In the background there were hundreds and hundreds of meetings that were shaking-out the details. But in this case, the UNPC was subordinate to the UNSC, and your interpretation of what GA/RES/181(II) says, it not accurate (in some cases) to the intention.

I consider this a very minor point, but it does give insight to the process. As you work through this, think of GA/RES/181(II) as the starting point that has an end-game of a two-state solution. The "Implementation Process" is a UN Security Council function by Charter and by Resolution. The UN Commission on Palestine was appointed as the action arm in the field for the UNSC and the Administration (Mandatory) for the Trusteeship (Palestine) as the UK Mandatory receded.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

Rocco, while we are going to live with the fact that we do not agree as to who was responsible for the implementation of Resolution 181, we can agree that the whole partition process was distinctly wonky regarding responsibilities and accountabilities with an uncomfortable mix between the Mandate Power (Britain), The Palestine Commission, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

On 17th May 1947 the Palestine Commission adjourned – ‘sine die’. In effect this means adjourning for an indefinite period. http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6262FDC8E5C889A685256A5700643573
At the adjournment meeting the Chairman stated “We disperse with our conscience clear. We have no fear about the judgment of history." Why the need to make such an obviously defensive closing remark? And what caused this adjournment and did the Security Council instruct it? No. The General Assembly did.

Leaving aside our disagreement, we are nonetheless left with a number of very uncomfortable additional questions which are difficult to answer:

1) How did the “181 recommendation” derive its legal force? The Covenent and the Mandate state clearly that the independence of Palestine can only be proposed by the Mandate Power; not by the League of Nations nor by its successor, the UN. The question therefore translates to: “When and how did Britain unequivocally accept the “181” recommendations? http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/israelborders.php

2) “181” contains a series of clear prescriptions as to what needed to happen before independence – Part 1 Section B. Since acceptance of the independence route by the Mandate Power would have been made under international law, any violation of these “Steps Preparatory to Independence” would be illegal. Were they all complied with? Who was responsible for compliance? When the Palestine Commission adjourned, to which entity was this accountability transferred? If there was no transfer, did it mean that the law had disappeared?

3) Where part of the Partition recommendation was not implemented, who became “owner” of the territory/territories that had not complied with “181”? Does the Palestine Commission still exist?

4) Was any institution or country allowed to change the applicable law in the face of non-compliance? If so, whom? If the USA, or say, Russia, accepted an event that was in non-compliance, does this mean that the event became legal? Was the mysterious “Trusteeship Council” only involved in Jerusalem? What role did it have in the implementation of “181”? Did it comply?

5) If not, who was responsible for ensuring peaceful compliance? Did they? In fact, was the Security Council in gross lapse of its accountabilities as granted under the Mandate Power’s acceptance of the “181” recommendations (if this happened)? If not, why? If not, what are the additional implications of the adjournment of the Palestine Commission. If this the “withering on the vine” and it so, did the UN act in line with the law; the UN Charter, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Mandate for Palestine; the administrative steps taken by the Mandate Power, etc.?

What does all of the above mean for the current situation in the southern Levant? Does solely the passage of time sanitise the errors? Can the UN approve illegal events?

Once we know the answers to these questions, we will still not have answered the question – “Why should the Arabs have accepted “181””, but we will know more about how legal the future process had been in reality.

 

Ask them Klip. Must be nice living in Gaza and the West bank, heck, ask Abbas.

 

Best yet TRANSFER them to Jordan, maybe they can Police Syria where their ancestors came from and some to Egypt since quite a few have Egyptian ancestry.

 

klipkap, et al,

Let's see!

(COMMENT)

Actually, I think the execution was pretty good given the requirement to please all the various players and factions. I've been in meetings with six people who couldn't agree on whether to get coffee from KBR or the Green Bean in a middle of a Rocket Attack.

(COMMENT)

Actually, it was 17 May 1948. (I assume that was just a typo.) But its importance is, that it was two days after Israel Declared Independence (15 May 1948 ); pursuant to the UNSC Implementation. While it might have been better in the long-term that the UNPC not retire, they did so with the consent of the UNSC (prior notice).

(COMMENT)

The Mandatory (UK) remanded the question and the solution to the UN, citing irreconcilable differences.

It was perfectly acceptable. And it was in accordance with the new International Trustee System. Additionally, it must be understood that the Mandate itself is a product of the Allied Powers. What they create, they can change or even desolve.

(COMMENT)

Part 1 Section B is always subject to Paragraph 14.

• The UN Palestine Commission (UNPC) was established.
• The UNPC gradually acquired mandatory Powers.
• The UNPC establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.
• A Provisional Council of Government was establish for Israel; the Arab Higher Committee declining.
• Prior to 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government.
• The transitional period for the Provisional Councils of Government was accepted (45 days).
• Full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence (2 days).
• The UNPC rendered instruction to the Provisional Council of Government for Israel; the Arab Higher Committee declining.
• The Provisional Council of Government for Israel recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes; the Arab Higher Committee declining.
• Elections for the Constituent Assembly were held in newly independent Israel on 25 January 1949, after Armistice. Elections being delayed due to military invasion.
• The Constituent Assembly convened on February 1949, transient law adopted, with the Basic Law established in 1950.
• The new economic union and transit was offset by the 1948-1949 War of independence. This essentially setback Israel in the financial arena, post-War. "A New Economic Policy was introduced in early 1952. It consisted of exchange rate devaluation, the gradual relaxation of price controls and rationing, and curbing of monetary expansion, primarily by budgetary restraint. Active immigration encouragement was curtailed, to await the absorption of the earlier mass immigration."

After reviewing the criteria, the UN Security Council favorably recommended in Resolution 69 (1949) Resolution of 4 March 1949 the admittance of Israel; and the General Assembly accepted via A/RES/273 (III) 11 May 1949 the Admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations.

Nothing illegal about it. Under the Charter, the UN accepted the work the State of Israel had done, even under exigent circumstance from Arab Aggression.

(COMMENT)

Ownership is a mutually exclusive issue relative to "sovereignty." If the US sells the State of Ohio to Canada, I still own my home. I am merely become a constituent of Canada, and fall under Canadian. Law. Such things have happened many times. It is how Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, Federated States of Micronesia, U.S. Virgin Islands, Marianas and alike became US Territory. But it did not affect land ownership. Once, the Philippines were a US Territory, but we granted them sovereignty. And again, land ownership did not play a part.

Israel became the sovereign power over the area outlined in General Assembly 181(II) and the associated Map; with minor post-Conflict adjustments.

(COMMENT)

Because the Arab Higher Committee declined to participate in the Partition Plan Implementation process, the territory outlined and apportioned would have fallen back to their responsibility. However, Jordanian intervention resulted in the West Bank being occupied by them, as well as Jerusalem.

Gaza became Occupied by the Egyptians.

I am unclear as to your question concerning the law.

In 1988, the PLO Declared Independence for Palestine in accordance with UN General Assembly 181(II). Oddly enough, they used the same GA Resolution as the basis for their right to self-determination.

In 1999, the Palestinian Permanent Observer to the UN stated in part:

While the Jewish Agency was the first to avail themselves to the opportunity of the "offer and acceptance" of GA/RES/181(II), ultimately, the Arab Palestinians have as well. And in December of 1988, the UN recognized it ---> "Recalling its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which, inter alia, it called for the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State in Palestine," --- Decides that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation "Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system via A/RES/43/177 15 December 1988.

Today, there are no unallocated territories in the Trusteeship System, even in the territory formerly under the mandate of Palestine.

(SPECIAL NOTE) Now it is understood that both Article 13 Jihadist (HAMAS) and Article 10 Feday'een (PNA) have both disavowed this and have created an internal dilemma; they are the principle cause for the continued conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Jihadist and Feday'een [or the supporting associate Hostile Arab Palestinians (HoAP) collectively] neither recognize GA/RES/181(II) (or anything derived from it), nor do they recognize the establishment of Israel claiming "Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit." Thus, they indirectly challenge the current legitimacy of the State of Palestine and the authority of the UN to recognition it. And this is the basis for most disputes.​

(COMMENT)

By 15 May 1948, neither the Covenant or the Mandate were applicable any more. It was the UN Charter. Two days later, the UNPC was no longer an actionable arm. The Arab Invasion changed the normal course of the implementation process. And the UNSC had to adapt.

(COMMENT)

The Levant is a much bigger area than just the territory formerly under mandate. If you are referring to the Levant Basin, it will make no difference to the West Bank, but might make a big difference to the Gaza Strip. There appears to be some oil, but a huge gas find there. And whoever ultimately ends-up governing the Gaza Strip will be entitled to some profit there. However, the Israeli initiative and investment in the basin is quite significant; as are the resulting finds.

As far as events go, you haven't identified one single illegal event for me to address. While in the period between the end of 1949 and today, there has been numerous events, the contribution to "right and wrong" is shared. Although it is safe to say that the most egregious offenses have been on the Arab Palestinian side.

You keep eluding to something illegal. Spit it out: What is your allegation in a straight forward manner?

(COMMENT)

We pretty much know the answer to the questions, at least the ones listed here.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

You see, that is where you and I differ, Rocco, and with this fundamental difference there is no point in me addressing your long post now, although I will try to find time to pay attention to certain key topics that you raise.

Our mega-difference is that I see Partition as an issue of Justice at the time. And since it underlies all that happened subsequently, it and the Mandate are fundamental to today, no matter how much time has passed.

That said, I view "the requirement to please all the various players and factions" as indeed being a major driver for certain key and senior players. But I do not see it as having a legally-based impact on the fundamental issues of what happened in 1947.

It is the swaying of imperatives towards "pleasing (senior) players" [away from "international law"] that leads to the chaos and corruption of many Third World countries and larger rogue states. I want no part of that as a norm for my planet, thank you.

The enxt issue, which you well-foundedly raised, was why the Security Council was so derelict in its duty to step in. This is made even worse in the context of "policing the law" by your view (not shared by me) that the SC was responsible for the implementation of "181". When the crap hit the fan the SC was almost notable by its absence. Everyting was left to the toothless (in lack of SC support) Palestine Commission. And in that dereliction we have the fourth in the succession of debacles that lead directly to todays mess.

That fundamental difference makes debate between us, while interesting, almost impossible regarding consensus.

 

klipkap, et al,

Remembering of course that the Palestine Liberation Organization accepted the legitimacy of GA/RES/181(II) in 1988 when it declared independence.

(COMMENT)

Yes, the question is mute.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

Considering that Muslims were actively allying themselves with the Nazis, the Arabs can go (*)(*)(*)(*) themselves. They chose sides and they since they chose not just the losing side but the freaking Nazi's I have zero sympathy for them. The Palestineans were originally kicked out of Trans-Jordan, why aren't Muslims constantly ragging on the Jordanians all the time. The fact is that no one wants the Palestinians in their land because they don't do anything accept blow (*)(*)(*)(*) up.

 

Zionists were also willing to ally themselves with the Fascists.
Did you know that?
Are you now willing to apply the rest of your reasoning to them also ... in the same way?
Please let us know so that we can judge your impartiality

 

66 Year old <crocodile tears>...would have, should have, could have... Hello... you say you deal in facts... but apparently despise the events that forces you to accept them... hmmm

 

You disregard 66 years old memories?

Then pray, tell me why 2500 year old ones are more valid as you Apologists continuously claim than 66 year old ones?. We would love to receive your reasoning..

By the way, speaking of ancient memories, we are still waiting for your explanation as to why should the Jews should have been granted all of Transjordan as a homeland country in which to settle (you and MGB are particularly fond of this; so was >Edwin), when they never occupied anything but a skinny strip in the extreme west, and then only for a short period in deep antiquity.? So even your 2500 year old memories are being distorted in the goal of achieving Ben-Gurion's dream.?

Please xplain this flood of one-sided logic.

 

Says whooooooooooooooo? The fellow who has a slogan <I deal in FACTS> when he dishes everything except FACTS!!!!!!!
There was a Palestine Mandate OK?
The Mandate included Jordan of today OK?
The Mandate was subdivided by a <Churchill coup de tete> OK
There was a Mesopotamian Mandate OK
The Kurds were robbed of their ancestral Home/Land... but no one not even KK speaks about it WHY????
Because he is an Arab apologist who loves to slander Jews and Israel... Does not even care about the Kurds!
I rest my case!!! Now a new <fangled angle> is going to be created/tackled.... But this, but that, but whatever... <the Land of Israel is for the Jews>... We have not conquered anything in 1967 we rather <LIBERATED THE LAND FROM THE JORDANIAN YOKE>!!!!!!!

 

What on earth does that have to do with the fact that the Arabs should forget what happened 66 years ago, but that the world MUST remember what happened 2500 years ago?

Secondly, the Jews were not granted Trans-Jordan. It was never the Israelite stomping ground. Have at least SOME respect for the facts. So your case rests on candyfloss. If that floats your boat, so be it. Jonsa, Gilos and Drew would never accept that flimsy deck of cards. You failed. The Israelites lived in the hill country and on the banks of the Jordan, NOT on the high eastern plateau which makes up 95% of Jordan. Those are FACTS HB.

Thirdly you took a gap of 2000 years. More than half of you still live in the diaspora by choice. NYC is the largetst Jewish city in the world. So 'scuse us if your reasoning is *CLANG* underwhelming.

Fourthly, your liberation is unsupported in law. Show me what Israel's legal boundaries are, that should be a piece of cake.Toodle-oo.

Does it now worry the Zionist Apologists that their experts and their own debate are so often glaringly fragile, either being fully trashed or dangling on a single dubious thread and faces with an avalanche of contrary FACTs.

Sure this suggests something to you? No? Ah well:

 

There was no Independent State called Palestine 66 years ago -------Dream on.

Suffices to show a map to refresh memories.

http://www.justicenow4israel.com/mandatemap.html

Yes we are earning money, we are like the South Americans working hard to sustain the Patrimony of the Jews.

Look at the map... Never met a more persistent fellow trying to drive a wedge between the Jews and their ancestral Land.

I agree... when people of your ilk appear at the horizon to slander, insult, defame Jews by denying them the right to rebuilt their ancestral home.