The Vietnam War – 42 years Ago

What are you talking about? Eisenhower was Diem's biggest supporter! Here's a letter from Eisenhower to Diem dated October 26, 1960: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11993&st=&st1=



Not exactly a hands-off approach.

 

As far as LBJ micromanaging the bombing campaign in the north - and Nixon's failure to mine Haiphong in 1969 for that matter - you have to take into account the geopolitical situation at the time. There wasn't going to be an outright military victory - they weren't going to march into Hanoi with the adoring crowds waving US flags, so for the conflict to end, there had to be a negotiated settlement eventually. If you had your eye toward this goal, then as President you had to make sure nothing you did militarily was going to foreclose that option. So how do you get there? The North Vietnamese weren't going to go to the negotiating table on their own - they had to be pushed into it by one of their sponsors - the Chinese and the Soviets.... so the road to peace had to go through either Moscow or Beijing, which was problematic because the US had no relations at all with the Chinese and all the Chinese were seemingly interested in anyway was proving they were more hardline than the Soviets. So the only real option was Moscow. That's why the strict ROEs and that's why Haiphong wasn't mined... because if you did that and you cut off the flow of Soviet aid then you cut off the leverage the Soviets had with Hanoi. Nixon was being disingenuous in that interview (What?! Nixon? Disingenuous?!? Who'd a thunk it?) because he only mined Haiphong after he opened up relations with China and after he had ABM and SALT to offer the Soviets. Once the Chinese put the screws on Hanoi and the Soviet aid dried up, the North Vietnamese came around pretty quick...well, okay, they came around pretty quick after all of that and having the crap bombed out of them again. Like I said...stubborn people.

 

Your link;
Esienhower playing geopolitics, you might want to read Esienhower's personal papers and biographies. Or all of the CIA dumps of former classified information that has been released in the past twenty years. (throw away the "Pentagon Papers" as a source.)

Like Longknife, been there and done that. When Longknife got on that freedom bird I was just coming into "in country" just after Tet of 68 as a FNG.

My parent unit was the NGF Plt., HQ Batry, 1/13. I was TAD to 1/26 (BLT 1/26) and 2/26 (BLT 2/26) All were at Khe Sanh.
When the draw down began in late 69 I found myself being transferred to Sub Unit One, 1 st ANGLICO. up on the DMZ, TAD with the 5th and 7th Marines. Veterans of the Battle of Hue. When I got my own NGF spot team I was assigned to the 1st ANGLICO Sub Unit One NGF Platoon at Hoi An and conducted NSFS and CAS for the ROK Marines Blue Dragons Brigade (Bad Ass) and the U.S. Army Americal Div.

Been there and done that. Those who indoctrinated our children haven't.

 

You sound pretty young Cordeller.

Of all of the past 44 Presidents Richard M. Nixon is considered to be the best POTUS when it came to geopolitics and foreign affairs. No other President has even came close to Nixon. Nixon was good.

It's been debated if Nixon were have won in 1960 would there have been a Viet Nam War ? Very unlikely. If Nixon who was the VP during the Esienhower administration would have stuck to Esienhower's strategy of containing communist expansion in southeast Asia there never would have been a shooting war in the RVN.

The JFK administration made the major mistake of dropping the line at the 17th parallel to stop communist expansion and allowing North Vietnam access to what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Laos was where communist expansion was suppose to be challenged at not at the 17th parallel. Esienhower had it right. Some say Esienhower knew something about fighting a war and winning. JFK and LBJ didn't.

 

and used to escalate the war as the lie of an attack on the ships supposedly ''justified" full military intervention


false flags are always used to "justify" wars such as Bush's anonymous reports that Iraq had WMD and was about to launch an invasion of the West - this is similar to daily reports we have been hearing for the past 20 years that Iran plans on starting Armageddon -- after all this time we are still waiting for the proof of this ridiculous claim

 

The SVN government was totally corrupt and many US defense contractors kept it that way with an awesome amount of bribery.

However, the true SVN capitalists managed to get out and are thriving in places throughout the world. Some are even going back to invest in their country.

 

*L* Well, I'm young enough not to have been born when you were in country. but old enough to take that as a compliment, Apacherat. Thanks. And thanks for your service - sounds like your got around a fair bit - spend any time at Oceanview? It's too bad the ARVN couldn't have been more like the Koreans... the war might have had a different outcome then.

As far as Eisenhower goes, do you know when he was leaving office and meeting President-elect Kennedy, he advised him to send the Marines into Laos? The PAVN's Group 559 had started doing serious work on the Ho Chi Minh trail in May 1959, which was almost 2 years before Eisenhower left office and had enlisted the Pathet Lao to destabilize the country... anyway, the whole country was a mess - it spelled real trouble for South Vietnam going forward and Eisenhower did SFA about it. So, essentially, Eisenhower was on his way out the door and leaving his mess with the new guy to clean up - kind of like what he did with Brigade 2506. Good luck with that, son.

Nixon was probably the best foreign affairs President the US ever had - I agree with you there. But I don't think even he could have sorted out the mess in Southeast Asia had he been elected in 1960. Would he have shifted away from Eisenhower's muscle-bound "massive retaliation" strategy and given himself the flexibility Kennedy did by building up the Special Forces? Probably not. Would he have undermined Diem? Again, probably not. I think Khrushchev probably would have given him more respect and probably wouldn't have pushed it as far in Berlin and Cuba the way he did with Kennedy, but it's Khrushchev we're talking about, so you never know. What I do think is that Nixon would have perceived Laos as a test and he probably would have heeded Eisenhower's advice in a big way. And he probably would have drawn the US into the Bay of Pigs too. So odds are you would have had the US tied down in two massive conflicts in Laos and Cuba...and that probably would have encouraged Khrushchev to be more aggressive on Berlin. But that's just my theory - until we ever figure out how to get to alternate universes, we'll never know.

 

Still though, pretty thin ground to build a nation.

 

It was the Soviets who were behind the commies in Laos.

Lets remember that the Soviets were in awe with Esienhower, they feared him but highly respected him as a soldier.
I think it was in 58 that Esienhower ordered a Marine Regimental Landing Team to Thailand and the Soviets blinked. They asked are you planning to put American combat troops into Laos ? Esienhower kinda said what do you think. So the Soviets cut back on supplying the commie Laos.

Esienhower as a general knew the key to stop communist expansion in Southeast Asia was controlling Laos. Control Laos North Vietnam has no access to support the VC in the RVN except across the 17th parallel.

It's true that JFK was contemplating using SEATO forces mostly American troops but as usual JFK didn't listen to his elders, Esienhower and the JCOS and was only going to put 4,000 American troops into Laos. But JFK hesitated until it was to late, JFK went against Esienhowers warnings and was going to make his stand at the 17th parallel.

Re: If Nixon were have won in 1960 ?

We don't really know but if Nixon stayed in touch with Esienhower he might have put 80,000 Marines and soldiers in Laos in 1961. He might have bombed North Vietnam and mined it's harbors in 1961 instead of 1972 / 1973.

It was Esienhower as a general who said a conventional war could be fought in Laos and won but not in Vietnam unless it was fought as total war.

JFK and his Special Forces, that was all the Rand Corporation doing. They were the ones who told JFK and LBJ that an unconventional war could be fought in South Vietnam. The Rand Corp. has a lot of Harvard grads on the payroll who actually thought they were smarter than everyone else including generals and admirals. The word counter insurgency has been around a long time but it was the Rand Corp. who coined the acronym "COIN" during the early 60's. You know how the military is, a lot of acronyms.

But the biggest problem with JFK and also McNamara they had a poor relationship and couldn't deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JCOS) Only two Presidents since the creation of the JCOS have ever had a good relationship with the JCOS, Esienhower and Reagan. Maybe G.H. Bush but not like what Esiehower and Reagan had. Only one other President had a worse relationship with the JCOS than JFK and that's Obama, he has no relationship at all with the JCOS.

But I digress.

Special Forces and the Vietnam War. The SF failures had more to do with Gen. Westmoreland, Westmoreland wasn't a big fan of winning hearts and minds. The Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons (CAP) had better results that the Army's Special Forces. Westmoreland wanted to fight the war as a major war and the Vietnam War was far from being a low intensity war. There were battles fought that were comparable and just a bloody as were fought during WW ll.

There are a lot of people who argued even during the war that the wrong tactics were being used in Vietnam, Gen. Krulak, Hackworth and a couple million soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen who were in-country.

 

I don't know anything about Eisenhower sending Marines into Thailand, Apacherat... I know Kennedy did in March of '61 in Operation Millpond. Maybe you were thinking about Lebanon and Operation Blue Bat?

Anyway, as far as I can tell, Eisenhower did SFA about Laos - he just left a mess there for his successor, but I guess that's what most outgoing Presidents seem to do. When he first came into office, Kennedy bought into Eisenhower's advice - hence Millpond, but I think the Bay of Pigs really shook things up for him. He looked around at all these officials he inherited from Eisenhower... Allen Dulles, General Lemnitzer - even ones he had admired all his life like Admiral Burke - and he decided that they really didn't have a clue what they were talking about. He was willing to put his faith on these people... I mean, what'd he know? He was just an old PT-Boat skipper - these people had been running the Pentagon for decades... he put his faith in them, and all they could come up with was some cockamamie plan to invade Cuba that had no chance of working. That was a head-spinner for Kennedy. He knew he had to take a different tack.

So he turned to people who thought outside the box - like General Taylor - and he shifted strategy from Eisenhower's "New Look" to "Flexible Response" and created the Green Berets and built up the CIA's counter-insurgency capacity and he tried to adapt to the situation as it was in Laos and Vietnam and not how he wished it was like Eisenhower did. Maybe it was a mistake, like you say? Maybe the US should have gone into Laos and Vietnam in a big way... maybe they should have mined Haiphong and backed up Brigade 2506 at the Bay of Pigs with military intervention. That's the road not taken. But where'd it lead? If you fought that kind of war, you'd have a US force in Vietnam and occupying Cuba fighting counterinsurgency campaigns for which it was ill-prepared across vast swathes of territory on opposite sides of the world. You know, Khrushchev gave a speech entitled "Wars of National Liberation" in January of 1961 - I'm struggling to find a link of the text for it here - but it outlined his basic strategy going forward and the hypothetical situation I just outlined pretty much plays right into that vision.

 

I just wanted to add a side-note on JCOS relations with the President... the way I figure it, it's the responsibility of the JCOS to give the President the very best military advice they can, but to also accept that the President is their commander-in-chief and that once he makes a decision - whether they agree with it or not - it's their responsibility to accept his decision and fall into line behind it and see that his orders are carried out. Once the President decides, the time for debate is over and the time for action begins. That's the same all up and down the line.... The skipper of Foxtrot Company, 2/1 Marines can ask his platoon commanders for advice before he leads his company in Fallujah, but in the final analysis, it's on his shoulders to call the shots... if Lt. Blanco over there in 3rd Platoon lacks the necessary enthusiasm and holds back his men and causes the assault to falter, well, whose head is that on? It's obvious, isn't it? So if we apply these rules to some butterbar in some sand-heap somewhere, shouldn't we damn well apply them to top Generals too? That being said, the President doesn't have to be liked by the JCOS, but he sure as hell better be respected by them... but if you're a service chief and you can't respect him, well, then it's your duty to resign, is it not?

 

The JCOS today are not like the JCOS of before 1986, because of the Goldwater–Nichols Act in 1986 the JCOS are no longer with in the military chain of command, they don't command anyone or issue orders. Their job today is to advise POTOS and the Secretary of Defense.

Members of the JCOS are not suppose to be yes men and are suppose to tell the President and and Secretary of Defense the way it is. No competent CnC, flag officer, field grade officer or company grade officer would surround himself with yes men, especially during war time.

Obama not being a competent CnC has surrounded himself with yes men.

The current Chief JCOS, Gen. Dempsey is the biggest brown nosing yes man to ever serve with the JCOS. In fact every member of the JCOS today are yes men. Obama has had six years to replace warriors with yes men and he has them all in place today. But it gets worse, Obama rarely meets with the JCOS and never listens to them. It's been Valerie Jarrett who's been micromanaging every aspect of the military from drag queens on Air Force bases to having Obama ordering SEAL Team Six to stand down three times when they were about to go after OBL.

 

FIGHTING THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-1973

Air Force Histories Reveal CIA Role in Laos, CIA Air Strike Missions,

New Evidence on Nuclear Weapons, Air Force Policy Disputes, During Vietnam War Years

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 248

Posted - April 9, 2008

JFK and the Diem Coup

 

First off, I don't think any officer makes it above Colonel unless he or she plays the game, so pretty much every officer wearing stars is a "yes man" in some way or another. The best officers retire with birds on their collars.

Secondly... I'm pretty sure you're not the President so you must be the Secretary of Defense since you know so well what the JCOS advises the President. Otherwise, how the hell would you know how straight they're being with their sitreps? What do you expect General Dempsey to do? Do an interview with Rolling Stone where he says how much the President ignores his advice?!? You don't know what goes on in those situation room meetings. Like I said before, it's General Dempsey's duty to give advice and it's the President's duty to make decisions... but once the decisions are made, it then becomes General Dempsey's duty to fall into line behind him. That's what a good soldier does, is it not?

Anyway....moving back to the subject at hand - I'm not familiar with this Erawan project, but it sounds like it didn't get much traction under Eisenhower... I imagine it had Lemay's fingerprints on it, so it was what probably became Farm Gate during the Kennedy Administration. The rest of what you quoted doesn't really refute anything I've already said.

 

I do have a family member who's a retired Lt. General and have a son and two nephews who are officers today, two in the Corps and one in the Navy, they do talk to me.

Gen. Mattis was no yes man but a warrior and he was just recently purged by Obama, probably because he was next in line to become Commandant of the Marine Corps and a member of the JCOS. Now it was Gen. Joseph Dunford who became Commandant and he was identified being a yes man back during the Bush administration I think around 2006.

There are some brown nosers and yes men in the military, the kind you don't want watching your six in the field or in the rear at some C&CC.

Lets see, it's official, women can't make it in Army special ops, lets watch and see if Obama tell's Gen. Dempsey "I don't give a (*)(*)(*)(*) if American soldiers will be killed in combat because there are unqualified women serving in combat, lower the standards Gen. Dempsey or you'll walk the plank."

That's what's been going on for the past six years.

 

No, we will never know. But the way you spell it out it makes sense to me and is pretty much what I remember. IKE did send in the White Star teams into Laos and called Laos the key to Southeast Asia. He told JFK to go it alone in Laos if he had to. IKE also kept us out of Vietnam twice. JFK decided since Laos was landlocked and it would be difficult to supply our forces there, Vietnam with its ports on the sea was a better place to make our stand.

I never really gave it much thought about how Nixon would have handled Southeast Asia if he were elected in 1960. The Nixon of 1960 and the Nixon of 1968 was two different people. Good post my friend,

 

NOTE TO HON. LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT


Document Type:
CREST
Collection:
CREST: 25-Year Program Archive
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070038-7
Release Decision:
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
File:
Attachment Size
CIA-RDP80B01676R002700070038-7.pdf 100.46 KB
Sequence Number:
38
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 3, 1961
Content Type:
NOTES
Body:
or-Release 04/03/16 ? CIA-ROP80BO1676R002700070
TRAL NTF.T.T.T/-V.Wr- VA1hm+u+w.....
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,-
U
I 25X
cc: DCI
ER
JSE!/'
z,b ,y
 Appro4. For0ease 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80B0167S02700070038-7
10 January 1961
25X1
TO: Director
FROM: Richard M. Bissell and Desmond FitzGerald
SESSION IAFTERNOON 9 JAN LARGELY
DEVOTED ANALYSIS FACTORS LEADING LAOTIAN CRISIS,
POSSIBLE COURSES FUTURE U.S. ACTION AND EFFECT
LOSS OF LAO 'WOULD HAVE ON OTHER FAR EAST NATIONS.
2. CONSENSUS
THAT OUTRIGHT
25
MILITARY DEFEAT U.S. SUPPORTED FORCES WOULD GRAVELY
AFFECT U.S. PRESTIGE AND DISPOSITION ALLIES RELY
FURTHER ON U.S. GUARANTEES. FORESEEN SPECIFICALLY
WAS EARLY NEUTRALIZATION THAILAND, MOST SERIOUS
MILITARY AND POLITICAL UNDERMINING SOUTH VIETNAM
AND ECLIPSE ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES INDONESIA.
CONFIDENCE IN U. S. STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION
EXPECTED SUFFER MAJOR IMPAIRMENT IN ALL NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES AND TO NOT MUCH LESS DEGREE IN SOUTH KOREA,
JAPAN AND PHILIPPINES. EFFECT OF LOSS OF LAOS THROUGH
PATHET LAO EROSION FOLLOWING SOME FORM POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT ESTIMATED AS EQUALLY DISASTROUS THOUGH
PERHAPS SLOWER IN TAKING EFFECT.
Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002700070038-7
? 703/9
 Approved Fo lease 2004/03/16 CIA-RDP80BO16 002700070038-7
.A 0 1 a
3. WHILE
(EXPRESSED VARYING VIEWS
MEASURES MOST LIKELY HOLD LINE IN LAOS, WE IMPRESSED
BY THEIR CONSENSUS THAT COMMUNIST VICTORY THAT
COUNTRY INEVITABLY DESTRUCTIVE OF U.S. POSITION IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. SUGGEST DULLES CONSIDER CALLING
TO ATTENTION ODACID POLICYMAKERS EXTREME SERIOUSNESS
OF AN OUTCOME THERE WHICH WOULD BE REGARDED AS
DEFEAT FOR U. S.
END OF MESSAGE
Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002700070038-7

http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/cia-rdp80b01676r002700070038-7


LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM JOHN A. MCCONE
November 4, 1961
http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/cia-rdp80b01676r002700070001-7



LAOS
Excerpt:

Going back to the situation at the Geneva Conference, Sisouk
then asked why did the Communists insist on inefficient controls,
on saying that the ICC has sufficient powers and that larger
Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004100150022-9
 Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R004100150022-9
powers would be an interference in the internal affairs of Laos.
Sisouk referred to the Secretary of State's statement at the
opening of the Conference, in which the Secretary said that the
enemy always comes from the north. Sisouk pointed out that the
areas controlled by the Pathet Lao and Souvaina were contiguous
with North Viet-Nam. Laos, he said, is a test of Communist
policy; they are trying to insert the "Troika" principle so as
to weaken Laos and thus find a way to expand into Southeast Asia.
Laos is to be used as a jumping-off point for aggression against
South Viet-Nam, in particular. That is why the Communists oppose
controls and guarantees and say that a simple declaration of
neutrality suffices...

http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/cia-rdp80b01676r004100150022-9

 

There are a few books on Laos and Thailand during the 1950's which set up the 1960's and the concentration on Vietnam. In Thailand which was not neutral as in 1950 we came to an agreement with them and set up MAAG Thailand. In 1951 SEA SUPPLY at Lopburi was set up, it was CIA to help the Thai Military and to gather info all over Southeast Asia. In 1952 MAAG Thailand became JUSMAGTHAI which is still alive and well today. Also ACAN, the Army Communications Administration Network arrived in 1952 and set up a torn tape relay for worldwide communications in Thailand. ACAN would become STARCOM which would become STRATCOM, which became USACC. Then the 83rd RRSOU followed, RRSOU is just another name for ASA and listening and monitoring post. There are more units but this is enough.

Then the big buildup followed. The buildup in Thailand of our military forces was for the situation in Laos especially following the Nam Tha, Laos incidence, not for Vietnam. I served in Laos from 1969-71 and have done a lot of research. I was part of Project 404 there. Here is a quick history of my unit that few people know about. It covers 1955 thru 1975.

HISTORY OF USAELMDEPCHJUSMAGTHAI (United States Army Element Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group Thailand) which served as a cover name for MAAG LAOS (Military Advisory and Assistance Group Laos) from 1962 to 1975

December1955 USOM PEO (United States Overseas Mission Programs Evaluations Office) Established in Vientiane Laos – Originally founded to advise the Ambassador and USOM on the military needs of the Royal Laotian Government and to oversee the use of U.S. military equipment was staffed with a few Reserve, Retired and former U.S. Military Personal would soon become an undercover MAAG for Laos with a total authorized strength of 514 in 1959 which around 150 were Special Forces Personnel TDY to USOM PEO.

April 1957 Project Erawan begins – The Thai Army starts training Royal Laotian Army Personnel at Lopburi Thailand with the full consent of the USOM PEO or MAAG Laos

April 1961 President Kennedy authorizes USOM PEO to openly operate as a MAAG LAOS, the Special Forces Teams in Laos now become known as White Star Mobile Training Teams. Prior to this, these teams had been known by various codenames Foretell, Monkhood, Molecular, Footsore and probably some more.

23 July1962 Geneva Accords signed, all U.S. military had to leave Laos. MAAG Laos first departed Vientiane, Laos to Nong Khai, Thailand and then to the Capital Hotel in Bangkok. General Tucker who was the Chief MAAG changes the name of MAAG LAOS to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI upon the move to Bangkok. The name change was made as a cover for the MAAG to Laos. The Capital Hotel was located on Phahon Yothin Road across town from the real JUSMAGTHAI which was located on Satorn Road. For its entire stay in Bangkok, the name changed worked, outside of those who worked for DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI; everyone assumed they were part of the real JUSMAGTHAI, which of course they weren’t. They were two complete different units and organizations, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI responsible for Laos and the real JUSMAGTHAI for Thailand.

The White Star teams stayed in Bangkok for awhile and were known as DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI U.S. ARMY ELEMENT ADVISORY GROUP BANGKOK.

12 October 1962 Ambassador Unger approves 30 retired US military officers to re enter Laos under the control of USAID/RO (United States Agency for International Development – Requirements Office).

October 1962 The CIA’s 4802nd JLD (Joint Liaison Detachment) is created at Udorn

October 1962 Operation Pepper Grinder begins south of Ramasan and on Udorn RTAFB which became known as AB-1 flights

October 1962 Operation Red Cap begin at Don Muang RTAFB outside of Bangkok

December 1963 The last of the White Star teams now known as US ARMY ELEMENT ADVISORY GROUP BANGKOK departs Thailand. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI assumes basically just an assistance mission for Laos.

1 April1964 Project Water Pump begins the training of Royal Lao Air Force at Udorn. This is a combined effort of the CIA’s 4802nd JLD, the 56thSOW and funding from DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

March 1966 Project 404 begins with 120 active duty US Air Force and Army Personnel allowed to enter Laos. These active duty personnel, although assigned to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, once they cross the Mekong River into Laos come under the operational control of the Attaches. The Army Personnel are divided among the regional liaison detachments and the USAF personnel divided between AOC’s.

11 March 1968 Lima Site 85 falls to the NVA

September1969 Project 404 personnel begin to get back into the training and advising of the Royal Laotian Military which had been missing since the departure of the MAAG from Laos in 1962.

October 1971 DEPCHUSMAGTHAI becomes the sole fiscal manager for all military programs in Laos.

December 1971 DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI moves from the Capital Hotel in Bangkok to UDORN RTAFB in Northeastern Thailand. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI starts assisting in the training of KHMER Air Force and Army personnel on Ubon RTAFB, south of Ubon and in Pakse Laos. USMACTHAI/JTD takes over Operation Water Pump

October 1972 DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI regains control of all Project 404 personnel in Laos from the Attaches and training and advising of the Royal Laotian Military increases. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI is back being a full blown MAAG once more.

December1975 Laos falls to the Pathet Lao communists and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI disbands

 

Forgive me if I'm wrong here, but wasn't Dunford one of Mattis' guys? The way I remember it, it was Amos and Mattis on the short-list for Commandant after Conway and Amos pretty much got it because Gates wanted to keep Mattis in the field at CENTCOM. Hard to argue with that logic. Listen, I'm no Obama apologist - to me, he's Jimmy Carter... he's a good man doing a bad job in hard times. I've got nothing but respect for Bob Gates and he pretty much made the call on elevating Amos. Now if you want to talk about brown-nosers you don't need to look any farther than Tom Donilon... if there's a problem in this whole set-up, I think that's where it is. I can understand how you'd get a "difference in chemistry" between Mattis and Donilon.... hell, look at what Donilon did to General Jones.

As far as letting women into the Special Forces... maybe this is a generational thing, but I actually have no problem with it. I've known women who are as tough as nails and can take a lot more than any man could. I mean, hell, they're built for childbirth! *L* That being said, the standards shouldn't be lowered... nobody should be in there who can't carry their own sh*t.

 

Thank you kindly, Perotista... don't forget, the Nixon of '60 probably wouldn't have had Kissinger either. I sometimes think to have a successful foreign policy, a President needs to have that kind of back-channel operator. Eisenhower had Dulles, Jack had Bobby, Nixon had Kissinger, Reagan had Schultz, Bush had Baker. I think LBJ's failing was that he didn't have that figure in his administration which is all the more tragic because he actually did - Averell Harriman. I think Harriman was the greatest Secretary of State the US never had.

 

Once more I think you are correct. It was Bobby Kennedy talking to then Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin during the Cuban Missile crisis that may be one of the biggest reasons we are still here. I don't know about Harriman being the best Secretary of State, but he was certainly a man of substance and served FDR, Truman, Kennedy and to a lesser extent LBJ well.

 

I think if Kennedy lived to get a second term, you would have seen RFK become Secretary of State as JFK focused more of his energies on domestic policies. The only reason why he had Rusk at State was because he effectively wanted to manage foreign policy himself - Rusk was a passive leader... it's the same reason why Nixon had Rogers as his first-term Secretary. LBJ's mistake was that since he didn't have the same inclinations as Kennedy, he shouldn't have had the same personnel. He should have had a more activist leader there and Harriman would have fit the bill. He knew the Soviets personally - he had personally known and had extensive dealings with every Soviet leader since Lenin. He was US Ambassador to Moscow in World War II, he had Cabinet experience as Truman's Secretary of Commerce and he was a former Governor of New York, so he knew domestic politics. He had the perfect balance of experience.

Right after the '64 election, Dillon was stepping down at Treasury... I would have replaced him with McNamara. McNamara was an awesome peacetime SecDef, but the skills that make you a good peacetime Secretary make you a poor wartime one. I call that the Pentagon paradox. In peacetime you want a SecDef that keeps the services in line and controls runaway Defense spending, but in wartime that iron hand becomes a liability - it inhibits the services from doing what they need to do and causes unnecessary friction - Rumsfeld had the same problem. So when Vietnam looked like it was about to get worse, I would have shifted McNamara and put his skills to work on resolving the balance of payments problem and taxes. He would have been a natural fit there. Rusk I would have shifted to Defense where he would have been the service's advocate to the President instead of the President's advocate to the services as McNamara was. All of this would have opened up State for Harriman. Harriman negotiated the 1962 Geneva Accord that neutralized Laos and enabled the US to focus their efforts more narrowly on Vietnam. Harriman also undermined Diem... whether you agree with that or not, I think Diem's downfall was inevitable - that was the course he had set himself on. If that was the case, then the sooner you got rid of him the better. I don't know what Harriman would have done if he had been given a free hand to run foreign policy under Johnson, but I do know it probably couldn't have turned out worse than it did.

 

Re: Gen Amos aka with in the Marine Corps as Gen. Anus he was the most unpopular Commandant of the Marine Corps in the past 100 years.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps doesn't wear two hats but three hats. He's the Commandant and also a member of the JCOS but also has to protect the Corps mission, customs, traditions and it's own regulations. It's always been the job of the Commandant to prevent the Marine Corps being used for social engineering.

Re: Gen. Dunford, I don't know what incidents that took place where Dunford earned the label by the Marine Corps officers and SNCO corps as a yes man but it happened during the G.W. Bush administration around 2006.

Re: Gen. Mattis, Mattis made it clear that if he were to become Commandant, the Marine Corps would remain the worlds elite fighting force and that means no female Marines would be fighting along side Marine grunts as long as he was Commandant. The Obama administration looked at Mattis of being a road block of social engineering experimentation of the Marine Corps so Obama fired his ass.

 

I'm no fan of Amos myself, but I do think Mattis was more suited by temperament for a combat command than a desk job in the Pentagon. Patton was a great field commander too, but I'd shudder to see him in Eisenhower's place.

As far as Dunford goes, Mattis was the one who gave him the nickname "Fighting Joe" for leading the charge into Baghdad, so I don't really think that was an ironic moniker. It's true he received some pretty rapid promotions after that... maybe the grumblings just come from jealousy?

 

I'll concur with the second half, McNamara was a poor war time SECDEF just like Rumsfeld was during the G.W. Bush administration. Both micromanaged the military when it came to strategy and tactics on the battlefield.

But McNamara just like Rumsfeld wanted to make changes with in the military. It was McNamara who took away the Marines heavy sage green cotton herringbone twill utility jacket and trousers and had all branches of the military adopt the Army's olive drab fatigues. Then he went after the Navy, no more black shoe Navy and brown shoe Navy. The entire navy would be black shoe navy. Then he had the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force to start wearing black leather navy oxfords and every branch of the military today while in dressed uniform are still wearing navy oxfords.

But the biggest thing McNamara did that the Army and especially the Marine Corps opposed was to take away our M-14's and were forced to adopt a varmint rifle, the M-16. It was all political. There's well over a thousand names on that wall because of that rifle. There's been no other rifle in American history where so many have whined and complained about than the M-16 and even today soldiers and Marines are still complaining after fifty years.