Federal Judge To Wisconsin: You Know 'Traditional' Marriage Was Polygamy, Right?

Directly addresses what you said.

 

Changes the subject, as usual. The subject was that children are better off with two parents, REGARDLESS of whether they are the same or opposite sex. The response, as usual, ignored this fact, and started blathering about single mothers. But single mothers are irrelevant.

 

Which is what I DIRECTLY addressed.

Children of single mothers make up the majority of children without the advantage of TWO parents. Fewer single mothers means fewer children without two parents

 

Bull(*)(*)(*)(*)!!! The courts have let women come after a fricking sperm doner for child support.

 

???? I was referring to traditional marriage and where do you see any contradiction between what you said and what I said?

 

Well you have the right to advocate for your polygamy- and I support your right to advocate for whatever marriage you want.

And you have recourse to the same courts that these couples had- you and your 2 loving companions can sue in Federal Court to overturn the rules against polygamous marriages.

Go for it.

 

Oh Dixon- you know that is not true. And I have pointed it out to you repeatedly.

As marriage equality spreads state by state, same gender couples have the same parental rights as opposite gender couples- as in this case that I have pointed out to you a dozen times now

http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/...icle-1.1594320


A lesbian couple who wanted to cement the custody of their 1-year-old son with an adoption were denied by a Brooklyn judge who cited the state's marriage equality law.

The baby's non-biological mother - who is legally married to her partner and whose name appears on the child's birth certificate - asked to also adopt him so the couple would be protected in a case of separation or a medical emergency in a state that doesn't recognize same-sex marriage.

But in a first of its kind decision, Brooklyn Surrogate Judge Margarita Lopez Torres ruled that a redundant adoption “is neither necessary nor available” and that “no such action is warranted or permitted by this court to affirm an existing, recognized and protected parent-child relationship.”

The women, identified in court papers as A.C. and M.M. got hitched in Connecticut in 2011, with the marriage affirmed in New York. M.M. gave birth to Sebastian last year and the couple sought the extra protection, as many same sex parents do.

In the past, Lopez Torres wrote, she would have granted the petition “without any hesitation whatsoever.”

But in light of New York's legalization of same-sex marriage, “such action would imply that, notwithstanding the existing and lawful marital relationship between the petitioner and her spouse, true marriage equality remains yet to be attained, and that, although legally recognized in this state, a same-sex marriage remains somehow insufficient to establish a parent-child relationship,” she explained.

She noted that children born to married couples are considered legally theirs and pointed to the Supreme Court decision last year ordering the federal government to recognize gay marriage.

 

I have seen many of our Gay PF posters say that they too advocate eliminating marriage too.

Eliminating marriage would make marriage equal for all- no objection to me on that level- as long as John and James have the same rights to marriage or non-marriage as my wife and I enjoy, its fine with me.

 

The statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry.

When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.

Everyone has a fundamental right to marriage. The state must prove a sufficient interest in preventing same gender marriage, and both the state, and yourself have yet to provide any convincing argument as to how the State would be harmed by same gender marriage.

 

That is not an argument- that is an opinion that the courts have rejected.

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur
"This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"

 

No- your explanation shows you really don't know what DOMA was about.

And we have several states now that have had same gender marriage legalized by legislative action now.

 

Which is fine. However, other states will may honor that license when New York will honor my concealed carry license. Remember my right to bear arms is explicitly in the constitution.

 

Appeal to tradition doesn't particularly work.

As the court pointed out- the court in the original Loving v. Virginia appealed to tradition in ruling that the law against mixed race marriages was legal:

“Almighty God created
the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents.
And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.

You- as an individual have the right in the United States to marry- even if you are in prison, even if you are a deadbeat dad who owes child support- even if you are white and want to marry a black person.

The courts have said that in order for the State to deny that right, the State must provide a compelling reason why such a marriage would be harmful.

What is the harm to the State in allowing James and John to have the same legal recognition as my wife and I?

 

And up is down
And war is peace
And equal is unequal

When the ban on inter-racial marriages was struck down, no one argued that suddenly mixed race couples were getting special treatment. But that is the argument you make for same gender couples.

 

I don't argue for laws prohibiting gay marriage, so we're headed down the wrong road. My point was only to demonstrate that the judge's idea of tradition is not applicable to US law. The only tradition that matters is the US legal tradition, where precedence (a form of tradition itself) means everything. That legal tradition is based exclusively on Judeo-Christian values. That doesn't mean those values aren't present in other cultures or religions. It just means a judge is off her rocker to make any claims about tradition outside of the US tradition. Legally it's irrelevant. Logically she makes no sense whatsoever to cite worldwide tradition since the beginning of time. That's just stupid.

 

You absolutely have a right to bear arms under the Constitution- luckily for you the Supreme Court has firmly established that is a personal right and not a right for militia members.

You do not have an absolute right to carry a concealed weapon though- which is why you are required to get a license for it.

 

They had to avoid that like the plague in order to make their claim that marriage is limited to heterosexual in order to "disparage and injure" homosexuals because the tradition in the US directly contradicts their assertions.

 

I suspect you haven't actually read her ruling- which goes into the legal issues of tradition- so I will be glad to provide that portion of her ruling:

A. Tradition
Both defendants and amici defend Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage ban on the ground
of tradition. Defendants say that “[t]he traditional view of marriage—between a man and
woman . . . —has been recognized for millennia.” Dfts.’ Br., dkt. #102, at 45. Amici go
even further to state that “virtually all cultures through time” have recognized marriage “as
the union of an opposite-sex couple.” Amici’s Br., dkt. #109, at 3-4.

As an initial matter, defendants and amici have overstated their argument.

Throughout history, the most “traditional” form of marriage has not been between one man
and one woman, but between one man and multiple women, which presumably is not a
tradition that defendants and amici would like to continue. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage,
a History 10 (2005) (“Polygyny, whereby a man can have multiple wives, is the marriage
form found in more places and at more times than any other.&#8221.

Nevertheless, I agree with amici’s more general view that tradition can be important
because it often “reflects lessons of experience.” Amici’s Br., dkt. #109, at 7. For this
reason, courts should take great care when reviewing long-standing laws to consider what
those lessons of experience show. However, it is the reasons for the tradition and not the
tradition itself that may provide justification for a law. Griego, 316 P.3d at 871-72
(“[L]egislation must advance a state interest that is separate and apart from the classification
itself.” Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478-79 (“[W]hen tradition is offered to justify preserving a
statutory scheme that has been challenged on equal protection grounds, we must determine
whether the reasons underlying that tradition are sufficient to satisfy constitutional
requirements.&#8221. Otherwise, the state could justify a law simply by pointing to it. Varnum,
763 N.W.2d at 898 (“When a certain tradition is used as both the governmental objective
and the classification to further that objective, the equal protection analysis is transformed
into the circular question of whether the classification accomplishes the governmental
objective, which objective is to maintain the classification.” Hernandez v. Robles, 805
N.Y.S.2d 354, 382 (2005) (Saxe, J., dissenting) (“Employing the reasoning that marriage
must be limited to heterosexuals because that is what the institution has historically been,
merely justifies discrimination with the bare explanation that it has always been this way.&#8221.

Like moral disapproval, tradition alone proves nothing more than a state’s desire to prohibit
particular conduct. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 601-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]reserving the traditional institution of marriage’
is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex couples.&#8221.

Although many venerable practices are part of American history, there are darker
traditions as well, which later generations have rejected as denials of equality. For example,
“[r]ote reliance on historical exclusion as a justification . . . would have served to justify
slavery, anti-miscegenation laws and segregation.” Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579,
609 (Sup. Ct. 2005).

Similarly, women were deprived of many opportunities, including the
right to vote, for much of this country’s history, often because of “traditional” beliefs about
women’s abilities. E.g., Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. . . .The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.&#8221. With respect to marriage in
particular, there was a time when “the very being or legal existence of [a] woman [was]
suspended” when she married. William Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, 442-45 (1765).

In the 1870's, Elizabeth Cady Stanton went so far as to argue that marriage at that time was
“slavery” for women because they were required to forfeit so many rights. Jason Pierceson,
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States 41 (Rowman & Littlefield 2013).

The rejection of these inequalities by later generations shows that sometimes a
tradition may endure because of unexamined assumptions about a particular class of people
rather than because the laws serve the community as a whole. Compare Dronenburg v.
Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[C]ommon sense and common experience
demonstrate” that gay officers in military “are almost certain to be harmful to morale and
discipline.&#8221, with Jim Garamone, “Don’t Ask, Don't Tell’ Repeal Certified by President
Obama,” American Forces Press Service (July 22, 2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64780 (visited June 6, 2014) (“The
President, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and [the Secretary of Defense] have
certified that the implementation of repeal of [restrictions on gay persons in the military]
is consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion
and recruiting and retention of the armed forces.&#8221.

For this reason, the Supreme Court has
stated that the “[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give it immunity from attack
for lacking a rational basis,” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993), and it has “not
hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition
on its side.” Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (196.

Thus, if blind adherence to the pastis the only justification for the law, it must fail. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.
Rev. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
. . it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.&#8221.

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The judge spent several pages addressing exactly that- and I have just posted that entire section.

Feel free to address the judges comments, but I suspect you will avoid dealing with the actual ruling like the plague.

 

I have a right to bear arms. The supreme courts has said that said how that right is exercised is subject to licensing for safety reasons. If my homes state finds me safe enough to license then under faith and credit no other state should deny the license if they have the same license. New York does have concealed carry permits and they are not limited to law enforcement. New York has no legal justification for denying full faith and credit to my license.

Statistically and logically speaking a state like New York has a more valid justification for denying a drivers license as statistically cars are more dangerous than guns and regional differences in driving environment give some physical justification for one state denying a full faith and credit.

 

So a challenge to Dixon- and anyone else who wants to argue that the reason why marriage should be limited to heterosexual couples is because only they have the potential to procreate-

here is from the Wisconsin ruling:

In fact, Wisconsin already does inquire into the fertility of some marriage applicants, though in that case it requires the couple to certify that they arenot able to procreate, which itself is proof that Wisconsin sees value in marriages that do not produce children and is applying a double standard to same-sex couples.

Wis. Stat. §
765.03(1) (permitting first cousins to marry if “the female has attained the age of 55 years or where either party, at the time of application for a marriage license, submits an affidavit signed by a physician stating either party is permanently sterile&#8221.

So the State of Wisconsin not only does not require heterosexual couples to be able to procreate in order to get married- in some cases it requires heterosexual couples to prove that they cannot procreate before the State will allow them to be married.

Please explain how you believe that Wisconsin restricts marriage to heterosexual couples because only they have the 'potential for procreation' when the State of Wisconsin requires just the opposite of some heterosexual couples

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And that is certainly an argument that could be made to a federal judge- I haven't followed that issue- has that been argued in Federal court?

 

Actually war is war, equal is equal and unequal is still unequal

 

Dont forget, Im the one who argues that marriage INHIBITS procreation. Its your strawman the marriage requires procreation.

 

So you do not believe that the potential of procreation is related to who can be married?

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Yeah- I haven't figured out that argument yet either.

I didn't procreate until after i got married. Most everyone I know procreated after marriage.

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I still am waiting for an analysis of the 'only heterosexuals can be married' camp about why sterile first cousins are allowed to be married- but only if they prove that they are sterile- but not same gender couples.

 

Yes it does, even if you didn't specifically say the words "requirement of procreation".

I can't spell it out any more simply than I already have. There are only two points to consider...

1. You were arguing against gay marriage using children as your premise (the specifics of which are utterly irrelevant).
2. I pointed out the fact that procreation is not a requirement for marriage.

#2 logically makes #1 fallacious, thus, your argument is invalid. If children have absolutely no bearing on whether two people can marry, regardless of same or opposite sex, how can an argument against marriage, based on children, possibly be relevant??

I'm not sure who you're trying to convince with your nonsense. It certainly isn't working with me. Does it make you feel better to misrepresent every opposing argument? If you're paying attention to the other posts in this thread, it's clear no one is buying what you're selling.

 

Since 2011 Dixon has been arguing that marriage is limited to heterosexual couples because they have the potential to procreate:

Quote Originally Posted by dixon76710 View Post

Correct. Heterosexual couples, sexual couple of the opposite sex, are included because they have the potential to procreate while couples of the same sex, regardless of their sexuality is precluded because it is a physical impossibility for them to ever procreate.

Makes perfect sense if your goal is to encourage all couples who will procreate, to marry.

Wisconsin allows marriage of first cousins as long as the couple proves that they cannot procreate.

Wisconsin 'includes' those who cannot procreate- when they are heterosexuals, but excludes them when they are homosexuals.

Which is makes this faux argument so wonderfully ironic.