FAA In The Hot Seat Over Boeing 737 Max Certification

I am right there with you on those questions.

My problem all along has been this.
US pilots still never crashed any of the 737 Boeing's.

Do we simply have superior pilots and crew?

 

First off I don't believe the issues with the 737 Max is a fleetwide problem which there are many of. Two have crashed which tells me I'm probably correct on this. It's possible US airlines have not experienced the MCAS failure so who knows how they would handle the situation. I do know the problem will be fixed and the 737 Max will be another great aircraft built by Boeing.

 

I agree with you last statement that the FAA should never have allowed Boeing's FAA representatives do the final certifying of the 737 Max which is what this thread is about. I think we've all pretty much beaten the MCAS to death at this point. The focus should be on why the FAA chose to relinquish their responsibilities and by what authority/regulation gave them the right to do so?

 

But at least 5 different crews squawked the system through ASRS. Would you like to address the significance of that? A group of American pilots complained on the record to Boeing about MCAS. Would you like to address the meaning of that?

 

Wrong. It is not a passive system, it is an active system.

That is why both accident aircraft had their elevators trimmed to full travel down. MCAS did that, not fairies.

 

You do not understand the difference between a passive system and an active system. Passive systems operate in the background without needing to physically turn them on. That is MCAS. An active system requires it be turned on before it can be used which is how the AP.

 

I'll research that and get back to you.

 

Definitely, need to know that. It is just not hurting Boeing, it hurts the country too.

 

After being grounded and fixed, can you imagine if another one of these Boeing 737 Max jets crash and kill a couple hundred passengers. I'm sure a lot of people are going to be pretty nervous for awhile when these jets start flying again and I don't want to fly on one, because they are like the Ford Pinto of Passenger Jets.

 

I've been flying since 1967, thanks for the lesson flyboy.

 

I am a retired A&P/FCC certified mechanic with a specialty in electrical/avionics systems. The link I provided is an alarm system for automobiles. The terminology used is the same for both autos and aircraft. In my 40 years of aircaft maintenance I learned most pilots are not well informed on how systems work because they don't need to be to fly the aircraft. MCAS has no designated ON/OFF switch. The only way to disable MCAS is by switching off the elevator trim tab control. This is because MCAS is energize the moment the aircraft receives power. The flight manual for the 737 Max does not have a step for turning on MCAS in the preflight checklist. This makes MCAS a passive system. If it were an active system pilots would be required to physically turn the system on.

https://www.dedona.com/differences-between-passive-active-alarm-systems/

A passive alarm turns on automatically. Once the key is removed from the ignition and all the doors to the vehicle are closed, the alarm turns itself on. This function gives the alarm the name “passive,” as the driver does nothing to arm it.

An active alarm must be activated by the driver. As with a passive alarm, this usually involves the vehicle being parked with all doors closed. However, the driver must turn the system on, commonly done by clicking a button on a remote. The active role played by the driver in arming this alarm results in this being called an “active” alarm.

 

Passive in that the system powers up by itself.

Active in that it takes control of the pitch control.

 

You remind me of the days I had to deal with pilots who used terminoloy regarding aircraft systems incorrectly making my job more difficult. Please just stick to flying the plane and please leave the technical jargon to the maintenence department.

 

Lets hope after all this is corrected by FAA/Boeing, pilots will have a better grasp on recognizing an MCAS failure and how to correctly navigate through it. Because systems do fail it is mostly likely the system will fail again during the long life of the 737 Max.

 

You are relying to much on anonymous reports that may or may not support a conclusion the MCAS was directly involved.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristy...erstanding-pilot-safety-reports/#545e3d65fab2

ASRS is a fantastic resource for aviation safety, but conclusions should not be extrapolated that the data cannot support.

That’s why the specific scenarios identified in the reports are also important to examine closely. Two of the narratives concerning the 737 MAX described uncommanded nose pitch movements after takeoff when the autopilot was engaged. While this is definitely not how the autopilot normally behaves, and it may represent a hazard, it does not appear connected to the issues with the MCAS anti-stall controls on the MAX that have been suspected to have contributed to the crash of a Lion Air plane in Indonesia, since the MCAS is operative when the autopilot is off. In both cases reported in the ASRS system, the pilots immediately disengaged the autopilot, and the flights continued normally. In addition, the pilots referenced the attention to the MCAS resulting from the Lion Air crash, which in itself may drive the reporting of incidents that seem similar. One of the pilots specifically stated, “With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention.”

 

What happens when MCAS fails at a critical point in flight? The crew must diagnose the problem, disable MCAS, and maintain control of a plane that is demonstrably more susceptible to stalls? Ummm, no thank you.

 

Yes, dealing with narrow-minded mechanics can be a frustrating experience. So much book knowledge and so little appreciation for how they fly.

 

The MCAS thing is really just a case of runaway trim, which pilots have trained for going back decades. Of course the certification process requires a trim disconnect button be on the control yoke.

MCAS is runaway trim caused by a computer program NOT INCLUDED in the operator's manual by the manufacturer, showing either incredible lack of professionalism by the designer and builder OR a case of hiding something. MCAS equipped aircraft do not have a MCAS disconnect button on the yoke, making one wonder about the motivation of the manufacturer.

Boeing cheated in the certification process, plain and simple. It wasn't included in the manual because they had something to hide.

 

And what about the ASRS reporting? Do you still put alot of weight on that?

 

Narrow minded mechanics?!

 

Follow their procedures as crews always do when faced with emergencies. Is there ever any non critical point during flight?

 

Of course there is! I thought you said you were an avionics mech. Dealing with an mcas issue at cruise is quite different than on takeoff or short final. Are you simply being obtuse?

 

I'm also an experienced loadmaster on a C130 and accumulated hours of flight time.

 

Then you know that critical phases of flight has specific meaning. I guess obtuse it is. Good day.

 

I've done it myself, and nothing was done.

With this example regarding MCAS, the system is clearly useless. It serves no function at all except providing employment for some number of federal bureaucrats.