FAA In The Hot Seat Over Boeing 737 Max Certification

Clearly the FAA got way to friendly with Boeing. "Trust but verify"

 

I wonder if they tried to fly it when MCAS is deliberately activated.

 

My understanding of MCAS is it's always activated.

 

I mean - fool the system into thinking the aircraft stalled to see if a pilot can override MCAS.

 

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I sure hope the test crews pushed every button and pulled every breaker associated with MCAS and put it through a very rigorous test.

 

To test the software, they have to break the plane; we flew it with one AOA sensor broken, two... Garbage in, Garbage out. In this case we don't want Garbage out when it has Garbage in.

 

well i hope they get to the bottom of the problem and fix it quick. not good for the airline industry.

 

I worked in aircraft certification for 2 different small aircraft companies.

The MAX is so different from the original type certificated 737 that it was essentially a new airplane. Different engines in different locations resulting in aerodynamic effects that under certain conditions made the aircraft unstable by FAA standards. Boeing attempted a band-aid approach with the MCAS and it failed spectacularly.

Had the company leadership been conscientious and professional, it would have certified the new airplane as a new type, and done all the required testing for a new type.

 

how woudl the FAA know their was a software defect in the code?

 

I have flown once sense 911, just to much hassle, easier and more relaxing to drive if one can

 

MCAS can be effectively disabled by turning off the stabilizer trim. The whole sensor thing is valid, but rather beside the point.

That Boeing did not include that fact in the aircraft manual or any training supplements supports that they were cheating, that they had something to hide.

Smart and more experienced pilots discovered it themselves, but the younger and less experienced pilots did not.

 

Every aircraft Boeing builds is flown to it's new home. And usually be crews from the airlines that bought them. How many of those aircraft experienced MCAS issues during the ferry flights? No ferry flights were recorded with MCAS issues which means all MCAS systems were working the way they were supposed to when they left Boeing.

 

The MCAS was designed to always be active unlike the AP.

 

When did you fly a 737 Max with one sensor broken? And why?

 

I should have put quotes around that part, if they didn't fly the plane and test the software with broken parts, they were incompetent beyond imagining. Their paperwork to the FAA would say "we flew it with one AOA sensor given a bad reading..." They have to test if it works when broken.

Like say if you have two sensors, if they disagree, we could assume it shuts off, and if both agree but are wrong, what then, does the software look to another indicator that something is wrong, like are the pilots trying to trim with the switches excessively?

The FAA should not just be taking Boeing's word for anything at this point, they should be sitting there at a big table with every wiring diagram, all code, and electronic schematics of the boxes, and understand how they work and what could go wrong and what the software would do when it does.

 

Why is the software able to physically overpower the pilot? How in the hell could a system designed to overpower the pilot and force the nose down, not take proximity to the ground into its calculation?

 

That may be true, but it's beside the point. Yes, the airplane has flown many hours with no accidents.

But to keep things in perspective, even NBC found 5 examples within the anonymous ASRS files in which line pilots flying the airplane filed reports regarding MCAS malfunctions, which manifest as a runaway trim condition. They sent reports regarding those events to NASA, yet nothing was done.

It took 2 fatal crashes before anything was done.

Is it possible that Boeing would suppress any bad reports during those ferry flights? I'm not saying they did, but it is a common practice for US corporations to suppress or destroy records of events that put their product in a bad light.

 

Yes I know that, but I think MCAS becomes active only in certain configurations.

Rules require that all aircraft have a disconnect switch for the AP mounted on the control yoke. MCAS does not have that.

 

No, it is always active under all circumstances except when the AP is engaged.

 

Just two crashes since the Boeing 737 Max was certified. The airlines who bought the planes used their crews to ferry them to their new home. So if there were any issues with the MCAS the airlines didn't mention them.

 

Someone at the NTSB is seeing the safety record in light of the crashes happening at two foreign carriers.

 

As they should.

 

There are more errors made in the media reports than on the actual aircraft when flying. Look at what they still keep calling the black box. It is orange.

 

Because of the confusing media reporting I'm still not sure what the problem is. Is it the AoA sensors or the software that is used for MCAS?

 

MCAS was designed to work as a passive system. And as with any system it can be deactivated according to a Boeing bulletin if any airlines cared to review it which it seems some did not.