Russian Defense lines collapsing in Donetsk Oblast.

Russians are feeling the heat.
Al Jazeera
Putin declares martial law in annexed areas: What you should know

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued to target critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure with air, missile, and drone strikes.
• Russian troops conducted a limited ground attack in northern Kharkiv Oblast, seemingly suggesting that Russian forces may retain territorial aspirations in Kharkiv Oblast despite massive losses during recent Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Current and former US officials confirmed that members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are in Russian-occupied Crimea to train Russian forces on how to use the Iranian drones they purchased, thereby enabling likely Russian war crimes.
• Belarus continues to provide its territory and airspace to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine but remains highly unlikely to enter the war on Russia’s behalf.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to regain lost positions.
• Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the entire frontline in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in central Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge.
• Russian occupation authorities kidnapped Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel, likely to strengthen physical control over the ZNPP’s operations.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that mobilization ended on October 17 in Moscow Oblast, and Russian civilians continue to express their dissatisfaction with Russian mobilization.
• Russian occupation officials are attempting to incentivize Ukrainian citizens under Russian control in northern Kherson Oblast to flee to Russia as Ukrainian forces advance, and occupation authorities may increasingly force Ukrainian civilians to relocate further behind the frontlines or to Russia in the coming days. . . .

Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 8. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin stated on October 18 that authorities will complete dismantling the damaged spans of the Crimean bridge by the end of December 2022, indicating that Russian forces will likely have reduced logistics capabilities through Crimea for months.[32] Ukrainian sources shared footage of a large traffic jam in front of the Kerch Strait Bridge and claimed that one car passes through the inspection point every 40 minutes.[33] . . .

Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations across the entire frontline in Kherson Oblast on October 18. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces defeated a Ukrainian offensive in the direction of Kherson City near Zelenyi Hai (20km northwest of Kherson City) on October 18.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Bruskinske, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[22] Different Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines near Mylove (north of Beryslav) and are accumulating forces to launch a new counteroffensive toward Beryslav within the next 24 hours.[23] ISW offers no assessment of these claims. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces defeated a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance platoon attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions near Nova Kamyanka (about 40km northeast of Beryslav).[24]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in Central Kherson Oblast on October 18. Ukraine’s Southern Operational command reported that Ukrainian forces conducted about 100 fire missions and destroyed two Russian ammunition depots near or around Beryslav on October 18.[25] A local Kherson Telegram channel reported explosions in Russian-occupied Muzykivka (4km north of Kherson City), Kakhovka (6km east of Nova Kakhovka), and Nova Zburivka (approximately 47 km southwest of Kherson City).[26] . . .

 

Putin declares martial law in annexed regions of Ukraine | AP News
What Putin is doing is wrong. Putin still wants all of Ukraine and he won't quit until he gets it. Whether that happens remains to be seen.

 

Never going to happen. They'll hang him first.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to justify planned Russian retreats and the loss of significant territory in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are setting information conditions to conduct a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP); the Russian military may believe that breaching the dam could cover their retreat from the right bank of the Dnipro River and prevent or delay Ukrainian advances across the river.
• Russia continues to use the guise of civilian “evacuations” as a cover for the mass forced removal of civilians from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 19 declaration of martial law readiness is largely legal theater meant to legitimize activities the Russian military needs to undertake or is already undertaking while creating a framework for future mobilization and domestic restrictions.
• Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is continuing efforts to set himself and Wagner Group forces apart from conventional Russian military elements.
• Russian forces continued to conduct limited assaults to recapture lost territory in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to conduct assaults in the Kreminna-Svatove area.
• Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted another offensive push in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin passed a decree on October 19 seeking to address Russian military personnels’ ongoing concerns about timely payments and setting the blame on Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov for future payment issues.
• The Russian parliament proposed legal measures that would allow Russian authorities to minimize the domestic impacts of partial mobilization in potential future mobilization waves.
• Russian military officials continued to forcibly mobilize Ukrainian residents of Russian-occupied territories to labor or fight on behalf of the Russian military. . . .

Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to justify planned Russian retreats and significant territorial losses in Kherson Oblast. Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergey Surovikin reported during an appearance on Russian television that the Russian military leadership has to make “difficult decisions” regarding Kherson Oblast and accused Ukraine of planning to strike civilian and residential infrastructure in Kherson Oblast.[1] Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo relatedly noted that his administration is evacuating the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of a “large-scale” Ukrainian offensive.[2] Surovikin‘s and Saldo’s statements are likely attempts to set information conditions for a full Russian retreat across the Dnipro River, which would cede Kherson City and other significant territory in Kherson Oblast to advancing Ukrainian troops. Russian military leaders have evidently learned from previous informational and operational failures during the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast and are therefore likely attempting to mitigate the informational and operational consequences of failing to defend against another successful Ukrainian advance. . . .

 

I hope you're right.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• Russia is likely continuing to prepare for a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP).
• Russian forces are likely setting conditions to remove military and occupation elements from the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of imminent Ukrainian advances.
• The White House confirmed on October 20 that Iranian military personnel are in Russian-occupied Crimea, Ukraine to assist Russian forces in conducting drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Iran is providing military support to Russian forces in Ukraine despite new international sanctions likely in part because Iranian leaders believe that they need Moscow’s help to upend the US-led global order.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are consolidating limited regained positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 20 despite Ukrainian reports that Ukraine has liberated all but 1.8% of Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops have advanced in northern Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast but Russian sources contradicted their own claims on control of Bakhmut. Russian forces are likely continuing to falsify claims of advances in the Bakhmut area to portray themselves as making gains in at least one sector amid continuing losses in northeast and southern Ukraine.
• Russian regional governments and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to blame each other for military administrative failures. . . . .

Russia is likely continuing to prepare for a false flag attack on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 20 that Russian forces mined the dam of the Kakhovka HPP and noted that the HPP holds over 18 million cubic meters of water, which would cause massive and rapid flooding of settlements along the Dnipro River, including Kherson City.[1] Zelensky emphasized that the flooding would impact hundreds of thousands of people.[2] Russian sources, however, continued to accuse Ukrainian forces of shelling the Kakhovka HPP and have widely circulated graphics depicting the flood path in the event of a dam breach.[3] As ISW reported on October 19, Russian sources are likely setting information conditions for Russian forces to blow the dam after they withdraw from western Kherson Oblast and accuse Ukrainian forces of flooding the Dnipro River and surrounding settlements, partially in an attempt to cover their retreat further into eastern Kherson Oblast.[4] Continued Russian preparation for a false-flag attack on the Kakhovka HPP is also likely meant to distract from reports of Russian losses in Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces are likely setting conditions to remove military and occupation elements from the west bank of the Dnipro River in anticipation of imminent Ukrainian advances. Kherson City Telegram accounts claimed on October 20 that Russian forces disbanded and looted a fire station in Kherson City and ferried fire trucks, stolen civilian cars, and other miscellaneous household items across the Dnipro River to Hola Prystan.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm those reports. The Ukrainian service of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty also reported on October 20 that Russian forces are moving military equipment from the west bank to the east bank of the Dnipro River in the face of recent Ukrainian advances, and posted satellite imagery that shows a Russian cargo ferry traveling across the Dnipro River from Kozatske (west bank) to Nova Kakhovka (east bank).[6] Radio Liberty noted that the ferry is fully loaded when it arrives at Nova Kakhovka and empty when it returns to Kozatske and suggested that this movement has been ongoing since early October.[7] Taken in tandem, these reports indicate that Russian troops are likely deliberately removing large amounts of personnel and equipment from the west bank of the Dnipro River. Russian forces have likely learned, at least in part, from their failures during the panicked Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in the face of a previous Ukrainian counteroffensive. The militarily sensible thing would be to remove men and equipment in good order to avoid another devastating rout. Such a rout in Kherson could trap Russian forces and equipment on the west bank of the Dnipro River. . . . .

 

As Russian troops retreat, Ukrainians snap up their abandoned military gear

 

Russia is giving so much equipment to Ukraine as their army runs away.

 

Strategy "B"
And the machine started - the balls in the drum bump against each other. Lotto has been initiated and apparently the New World Order forces will not be able to shoot with their plan. They wanted to reduce the population on their own terms and introduce a new world system - a technocracy - governed by a world government. There was one problem. Omicron. Due to the omicron, this plan will not work out, because the omicron is appearently a specific vaccine for coronavirus. It gives poor symptoms, so everyone goes with such a cold everywhere, to work, school, shop, church or kindergarten. Instead of infecting two or three people in quarantine, it infects three hundred and there is no problem. Very quickly, the omicron has become practically the only coronavirus and as I say ... it gives poor symptoms, so practicaly nobody dies of it. No-one expected the omicron to appear, but it did.

The problem, however, is that Putin was to enter Poland, turn on biological and chemical weapons and collect bodies in Poland and seize Polish structures. And since the US is a maritime power, Putin was to "peacefully" enter Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal to have such a European passage into the Atlantic. Most of these countries would surrender without a fight, and Germany would probably even be happy.

However, there was a problem. Just as the power of the German economy is a myth (it is beautiful and nice in Germany, because they have Russian gas at Belarusian prices), or the power of the Russian armed forces is a myth (what we see now), the weakness of the Polish economy was also a myth. Despite the deepening crisis, in Poland the Gross Domestic Product is over 6%, and unemployment is around 4.6%. It is impossible to enter Poland this way, because Poland can afford to give the Russians a knockout. The New World Order did a few things wrong, so it must now implement Strategy B.

It is very easy. Soon we will hear about military scandals in some desert s...t-h...e. This war will be triggered by tabloids, or rather secret service that will use tabloids. From there, the conflict is likely to spread to the rest of the world. Why so? Because in Europe, it is already known, such a conflict cannot be triggered (NWO must keep Europe, U.S.A. and the rest of civilised world away from really knowing what is going on), and this B strategy effectively fits into the war of the future, where technology will fight technology somewhere in orbit.

The problem is that in the near future there will be no need for satellites, as everything will be achieved by quantum teleportation and quantum entanglement (watch YTb vidoes of “Remek H. Fifer” in this last matter).

So… Putin is waiting to give up and he deludes himself it will be on his terms.

 

US 101 Airborne Screaming Eagles land in Europe once again
After 77 years, U.S. Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division — nicknamed the "Screaming Eagles" — touched down on European soil in a continued effort to assist the U.S. Army’s V Corps and the 1st Infantry Division in supporting Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s eastern flank, Spc. Charles Leitner reports on U.S. Army’s website. To illustrate the event, Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division Sustainment Brigade performed a ceremonial uncasing of the unit’s flag, streamers and colors soon after arriving at the Grafenwöhr Training Area in Grafenwöhr, Germany, on October 6, 2022.

The U.S. Army's 101st Airborne is practicing for war with Russia just miles from Ukraine's border
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-news-russia-us-army-101st-airborne-nato-war-games-romania/
The U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division has been deployed to Europe for the first time in almost 80 years amid soaring tension between Russia and the American-led NATO military alliance. The light infantry unit, nicknamed the "Screaming Eagles," is trained to deploy on any battlefield in the world within hours, ready to fight.

CBS News joined the division's Deputy Commander, Brigadier General John Lubas, and Colonel Edwin Matthaidess, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, on a Black Hawk helicopter for the hour-long ride to the very edge of NATO territory — only around three miles from Romania's border with Ukraine.

 

mean looking bunch.....



In a couple of days when they're pushed up front...sausage eaten...lack of supplies....I wonder if they'll eat the first guy...??.....he be quite a beefy boy!!

 

LOL....probably!!

When fat boy gets popped....fresh meat for the other 2?

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• The Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast has begun. Russian forces likely intend to continue that withdrawal over the next several weeks but may struggle to withdraw in good order if Ukrainian forces choose to attack.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is demonstrably setting conditions for Russia to continue a protracted war in Ukraine, not for a negotiated settlement or offramp.
• Russian forces will likely attempt to blow up the dam at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) to cover their withdrawal from Kherson City and to prevent Ukrainian forces from pursuing Russian forces deeper into Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on October 21 creating a Russian government “coordination council” to improve wartime federal coordination.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border, on the Svatove-Kreminna frontline, and west of Lysychansk.
• Ukrainian military officials offered a limited overview of the situation on the frontline.
• Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command emphasized that Russian forces are using Ukrainian civilians as human shields when transporting military equipment across the Dnipro River, while Russian sources released footage showing a line of civilians awaiting the ferry from Kherson City.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast and routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv Oblast.
• Russian authorities are attempting to maintain the façade of sustainable and strong logistics in southern Ukraine while accelerating measures to compensate for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
• Fissures between regional Russian officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military commissariats, and the Russian civilian population from which mobilization draws will likely intensify in the coming months.
• Russian authorities are preventing Ukrainians in Russia from leaving Russia with complex residency and permit requirements to cross international borders.
• Russian occupation authorities continued the mass forced removal of civilians from the west bank of the Dnipro River under the guise of civilian “evacuations.” . . . .

The Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast has begun. Russian forces likely intend to continue that withdrawal over the next several weeks but may struggle to withdraw in good order if Ukrainian forces choose to attack. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on October 21 that Russian forces are “quite actively” transferring ammunition, military equipment, and some unspecified units from the Dnipro River’s west bank to the east bank via ferries.[1] The Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces deployed 2,000 mobilized men to hold the frontlines and are continuing to shell Ukrainian positions, likely in an effort to cover their withdrawal.[2] Ukrainian military officials reported that the Russian occupation administration is preparing the evacuation of imported Russian specialists, Ukrainian collaborators, and Kherson’s banking system.[3] Russian occupation administration in Beryslav and humanitarian facilities in Kherson City also reportedly ceased operations.[4]

The Russian withdrawal from western Kherson requires that a Russian detachment left in contact hold the line against Ukrainian attack, covering other Russian forces as they withdraw. Such a detachment must be well-trained, professional, and prepared to die for its compatriots to effectively perform that duty. The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, assessed on October 20 that Russian military leadership may withdraw “the most combat-capable units” from the left-bank part of the region to the right bank of the Dnipro river and leave mobilized soldiers in contact to cover the withdrawal.[5] Russian milbloggers seized on Hromov’s assessment on October 21 and claimed that Ukrainian officials falsely said that elite units like the VDV and marines are being replaced by untrained mobilized men in Kherson.[6] If Hromov’s assessment is correct, then Russian forces would be setting conditions for a Russian withdrawal to become a rout. Russia’s poorly trained, newly mobilized reservists are very unlikely to stand and resist a Ukrainian counterattack if Ukrainian forces chose to attack them and chase the withdrawing forces. The collapse of a mobilized reservist detachment left in contact would likely lead to a Ukrainian rout of Russian forces on the same scale as Ukraine’s rout of Russian forces in Kharkiv. . . .

Russian forces attempted an unsuccessful assault northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border and continued to shell settlements along the Oskil River on October 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Ternova, approximately 40km northeast of Kharkiv City.[18] Ukrainian officials and Russian sources reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike on industrial infrastructure in Kyivsky Raion in Kharkiv City.[19] Russian forces continued to shell and launch airstrikes on Kupyansk and settlements in its vicinity.[20]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to fight on the Svatove-Kreminna frontline on October 21. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that the territory near Svatove remained the most active frontline as Russian forces continued to try to regain their lost positions around Svatove.[21] Haidai added that Russian forces concentrated most of their military equipment near Svatove and Troitske (about 55km northeast of Svatove).[22] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Lyman.[23] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack in the vicinity of Terny (about 16km northeast of Lyman) and tried to reach the R66 Kreminna-Svatove highway.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense also claimed that Russian artillery fire prevented Ukrainian forces from crossing the Zherebets River near Novovodyane (about 18km southwest of Svatove) and Torske (approximately 13km east of Lyman).[25] . . .

 

so...news blackout from Kherson continues (SOP)....but according to what I've heard....

...there's going to be some big smiles and good news from Ukraine shortly.

 

They look ready to, uh, run away.

 

...some Russian lad wibbling away about the lack of logs for trenches.....



plea for logs video... Twitter

...tell you what lad...here's a solution to your lack of logs problem...how about you and your mates pack your **** into a bergen and sod off back home? There problem solved

 

....yeah...they don't have that brimming with confidence colgate smile about them do they....bless em....

 

I wonder if they packed starting blocks.

 

Run? Well, maybe two of them

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• 
  
  • Russian forces continued large-scale strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Ongoing strikes are unlikely to erode Ukrainian will to fight but will pose economic and humanitarian challenges throughout the winter.
  • Russian forces continued to withdraw from western Kherson Oblast while preparing for delaying actions that will likely be only partially effective.
  • Occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast ordered civilians to evacuate east on October 21. Evacuations from Kherson City will support likely Russian plans to blow up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant (HPP) dam to cover their withdrawal.
  • Prigozhin-led efforts to build a “Wagner Line” of defensive fortifications extend through central Luhansk Oblast and in limited capacity into Belgorod.
  • Prigozhin’s efforts and messaging, including the creation of the “Wagner Line,” are increasingly out of line with Kremlin rhetoric and are critical of what Prigozhin claims are slow-moving “bureaucrat-enemies.” Such activism endears Prigozhin to Russian nationalists, who are dissatisfied with limited Kremlin escalation and MoD disorganization.
  • Russian sources reported Ukrainian counteroffensives in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 22.
  • Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks with no confirmed advances to regain lost territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts on October 22.
  • Crimean occupation authorities banned filming of infrastructure and military logistics likely due to continued Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian supply hubs and lines.
  • ISW identified additional reports on October 22 that Russian mobilization has not met force generation goals and will likely continue in alternative forms.
  • Russian and occupation administration officials continued to forcibly relocate residents in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine as of October 22.
  • Russian and occupation officials continued to restrict the movement of residents living in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and increase the checkpoint controls as of October 22. . . . .

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault in the direction of Kuzymivka (13km northwest of Svatove) near the N26 highway that leads into Svatove from the north.[20] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Kreminna near Novovodiane (24km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[21] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault west of Kreminna near Terny.[22] A Russian Combat Reserve BARS-13 affiliated Telegram channel claimed that BARS-13 artillery units repelled an attempted Ukrainian advance north of Kreminna.[23] The BARS-13 affiliated Telegram channel also claimed that Ukrainian maneuvers near Terny and Novosadove (17km northwest of Kreminna) suggested that Russian forces lack continuous defensive positions along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway, despite previous claims from Russian sources to the contrary.[24] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Kreminna and Svatove directions on October 22. . . .

Russian forces are likely conducting a fighting withdrawal and are continuing to strike Ukrainian positions in northwestern Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled settlements near the Inhulets River and northwest of Kherson City and condcuted an airstrike against Novovoskresenske (about 66km northeast of Nova Kakhovka).[28] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian helicopters attacked Ukrainian forces in Nova Kamianka and Tryfonivka (about 55km northeast of Nova Kakhovka) three times.[29] Ukraine‘s Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces also attacked Novovoskresenske and settlements in its vicinity with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones and S-300 systems attacking ground targets.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[31] Russian proxy officials claimed that Russian paratroopers (VDV units) are continuing to operate in northern Kherson Oblast.[32] Geolocated footage showed Russian artillery targeting Ukrainian forces in Bezimenne, about 15km southeast of Inhulets River.[33] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, October 23. This report focuses on Russian Defense Minister Shoigu's several calls with his western counterparts and preposterous claims that Ukraine is preparing a false-flag “dirty bomb” attack against Russia, likely to pressure Ukraine into concessions and intimidate NATO. On the battlefield, Ukrainian forces conducted further offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine, and Russian forces continued to set conditions for a withdrawal from Kherson. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow. . . . .


Key inflections in ongoing military operations on October 23:

• Russian authorities likely cut internet access in Kherson City on October 22 to limit local reporting of Russian evacuations to the east bank of the Dnipro River.[9] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[10]
• Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting near Siversk, Soledar, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka in eastern Ukraine.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.[12]
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove.[13]
• Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, and other areas in Mykolaiv Oblast with Shahed 136 drones and S-300 missiles.[14] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Nikopol and Marhanets with multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strikes.[15]
• A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force Command claimed that Ukrainian forces have shot down a total of 273 Iranian-provided Shahed-136 drones since Russia began using them in Ukraine on September 13.[16]
• A Ukrainian government source reported that Iranian instructors in Belarus (in addition to previously reported instructors in Crimea) aided Russian forces in the coordination of previous Shahed-136 drone strikes against Kyiv Oblast and northern and western oblasts in Ukraine.[17]
• Russian outlets continued to set conditions to blame Ukraine for the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, which Russian forces will likely destroy to slow advancing Ukrainian forces[18][19]
• Russian sources widely discussed the construction of defensive positions in Kursk Oblast.[20]
• A Ukrainian source reported that Russian authorities in Krasnodar Krai have “indefinitely” extended the “vacations” (meaning forced abductions as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign) of children from Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast.[21]
• Russian sources reported that private businesses are offering to train mobilized men on privately owned military and medical equipment in exchange for money.[22] Another Russian fighter aircraft crashed into a two-story building in Novo-Lenino, Irkutsk Oblast.[23] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin intensified its information operation to accuse Ukraine of preparing to conduct a false-flag attack using a dirty bomb for a second day in a row.
• Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated on October 24 that the impact of Russian terrorist strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure is waning.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts on September 30 ignited a schism within the Kremlin, which will likely intensify as Ukraine liberates more territories according to Budanov.
• Prigozhin continues to accrue power and is setting up a military structure parallel to the Russian Armed Forces, which may come to pose a threat to Putin’s rule – at least within the information space.
• Russian forces are likely preparing to defend Kherson City and are not fully withdrawing from upper Kherson Oblast despite previous confirmed reports of some Russian elements withdrawing from upper Kherson Oblast.
• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured Karmazynivka, Miasozharivka, and Nevske in Luhansk Oblast and Novosadove in Donetsk Oblast.
• Kursk Oblast Govenor Roman Starovoit announced the completion of the construction of two reinforced defense lines on the border with Ukraine on October 23 — likely an act of security theater designed to target a domestic Russian audience since there is no danger whatsoever of a Ukrainian mechanized invasion of Russia.
• Wagner Group financer Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged the slow pace of Wagner Group ground operations around Bakhmut as Russian forces continued to lose ground near the city.
• Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian force concentrations near the Zaporizhia Oblast front line on October 23–24 and struck a Russian force and equipment concentration in the vicinity of Enerhodar on October 22.
• Hurried Russian mobilization efforts to fix personnel shortages on the front lines have cannibalized the Russian force-generation staff and diminished Russia’s ability to effectively train and deploy new personnel and to staff domestic industries.
• Occupation administration officials have taken down communications systems in Kherson City in an attempt to limit civilian reporting on Russian positions to Ukrainian forces ahead of anticipated Ukrainian advances. . . .

Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief, Major General Kyrylo Budanov, stated on October 24 that the impact of Russian terrorist strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure is waning as Russian forces further deplete their limited arsenal of cruise missiles.[7] . . . .

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts on September 30 ignited a schism within the Kremlin, which will likely intensify as Ukraine liberates more territories, according to Budanov. Budanov stated that Kremlin elites largely did not support Putin’s decision to annex Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts prior to securing those territories, prompting many officials to contact their Western counterparts to express their disinterest in continuing the war in Ukraine.[9] Budanov claimed that some Kremlin officials began advocating for negotiations with Ukraine to their Western counterparts while the Russian military-political command plotted missile strikes to scare Ukrainians into negotiations. Budanov‘s statement is consistent with the influx of Western reports about direct criticism of Putin within the Kremlin less than a week after the annexation announcement around October 6.[10] Wagner Group–affiliated Telegram channels also noted the emergence of the pro-war and pro-negotiations factions within the Kremlin within the same timeframe.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin has been consistently referencing the factionalization within the Kremlin since, even explicitly stating that he is part of the “war until victory” faction.[12] These observations raise the possibility that hints from insiders of a Kremlin readiness to engage in serious negotiations may not reflect Putin’s own views or any decisions he has taken but may instead be part of efforts by those who have lost the internal argument with him to persuade the West and Ukraine to offer concessions in hopes of bringing him around to their point of view. . . .

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated Karmazynivka, Miasozharivka, and Nevske in Luhansk Oblast and Novosadove in Donetsk Oblast on October 24.[34] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Nevske and its surrounding settlements on October 10.[35] . . . .

Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign in central and northern Kherson Oblast on October 23 and 24. Geolocated footage showed the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on an electric machine-building plant in Nova Kakhovka — a strike Russian sources used to accuse Ukrainian forces of hitting the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant 4km northwest of the electric machine-building plant.[47] Other geolocated footage reportedly showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on an area of Russian manpower concentration in Kairy, about 27km northeast of Nova Kakhovka.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that a Ukrainian strike on a Russian manpower concentration point in Nova Kakhovka on an unspecified date wounded about 150 Russian servicemen and destroyed six unspecified pieces of military equipment.[49] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command added that Ukrainian forces destroyed four ammunition depots in Pervomaisk and Beryslav raions.[50] . . . .

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Key Takeaways

• Russian siloviki factions continue to voice dissatisfaction with the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely indicating that President Vladimir Putin will struggle to appease the pro-war faction.
• Direct confrontations between Putin and siloviki members regarding the war in Ukraine illustrate the significance of siloviki factions in Russian power structures.
• Russian officials are likely rhetorically realigning the war in Ukraine with religious ideals ostensibly accessible to both Christians and Muslims to cater to religious and ethnic minorities.
• Russian occupation officials continue to claim that the evacuations in Kherson Oblast are a part of a larger resettlement program.
• Levada polling surveys suggest that the Russian public’s sentiments toward the Russian government have not fundamentally changed despite societal pressures associated with the war in Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west of Svatove and on Kreminna on October 25.
• Russian forces continued to establish fallback and defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to mobilize personnel in violation of recruitment policies. Russian mobilization efforts also are placing strains on the Russian labor market.
• Ukrainian partisans conducted an attack targeting the occupation head in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. . . .

Russian forces continued to establish fallback positions near the Dnipro River on October 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are preparing defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and are mining the coastline near Hornostaivka, about 40km northeast of Nova Kakhovka.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are leaving small passages for a potential retreat and are attempting to repair destroyed pontoon crossings.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command has not decided on the fate of Kherson City, given the ongoing situation in Kherson Oblast.[33] Other milbloggers argued that Russian forces will be unable to hold Kherson City and that the Russian government can prevent a “Battle of Stalingrad” by fully withdrawing to the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.[34] . . .

Ukrainian partisans conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against a building owned by the head of the Zaporizhia occupation administration in Melitopol on October 25. Russian media and Ukrainian sources reported that a car exploded near the headquarters of the Russian propaganda channel ZaTV where a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) branch was reportedly deployed.[65] Various sources reported that the building belongs to Zaporizhia occupation head Yevheny Balitsky, who was not present at the time of the attack.[66] Russian milbloggers called the event a “terrorist attack” and called for more stringent law enforcement protections in occupied areas.[67] . . . .

 

Russia-Ukraine war latest: 1,000 bodies exhumed in recently liberated territories,